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Abstract
We report estimates of a version of the Random Utility and Random Opportunity
(ruro) model of job choice (Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm, 1995, and Aaberge, Colom-
bino and Strøm, 1999) on Belgian data (silc 2007). The paper exploits the distinction
between preference factors and individual differences in opportunities in such a ruro–
model, in order to obtain a more nuanced picture of labour market participation of the
elderly. More specifically, the estimated model allows to give a quantitative answer to
the question to what extent lower labour market participation of elderly is due to chan-
ging preferences (executing a job might become less enjoyable with age) or differences
in opportunities (elderly getting less, or less attractive job offers).
† ces–kuleuven, Naamsestraat 69, B3000 Leuven, Belgium,
e–mail: bart.capeau@kuleuven.be, andre.decoster@kuleuven.be.
We are grateful to Rolf Aaberge and Ugo Colombino for an introduction into and many discussions on the
ruro–model, to Tom Wennemo for technical assistance with the estimation program and to Bart Cockx
and Gijs Dekkers for comments on earlier versions of the paper. Pieter Vanleenhove, Toon Vanheukelom
and Rembert De Blander prepared the data from eu-silc 2007, and used euromod version 5.5 to calculate
net incomes for the choice sets. We acknowledge financial support from the belspo–projects mimbel and
bel–ageing. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
In the present paper we investigate the impact of ageing on job choice behaviour, using a
structural discrete choice model. Existing literature has concentrated on the early exit of
elderly from the labour market. Emphasis has been put on the role of financial incentives in
the social security system to leave or remain active in the labour market. See for example
Gruber and Wise (1999) for an overview of these issues in different oecd countries. To that
purpose, the net social security wealth, that is the present value of future benefits minus the
present value of social security contributions, and the accrual of that wealth by postponing
retirement or exit from the labour market through other channels such as special early leaver
schemes, were used as indicators.1 Later on, the financial implications of such social security
schemes were included in a utility based decision model (Stock and Wise 1990).2 The Stock
and Wise approach boils down to the question whether continuing to work one year longer
would yield a higher expected utility than retiring now. This departs from a fully forward
looking dynamic framework of maximizing expected utility, in which at each point in time
an optimal decision is taken, for each possible value of future possible states of the world,
and expectations are taken over the possible evolution of the state of the world through
time. While such fully forward looking models were developed to study the retirement
decision (Rust, 1989, Berkovec and Stern, 1991, Rust and Phelan, 1997), they have been
criticised for their computational complexity in exchange for a poor gain in predictive validity
(Lumsdaine et al. 1992, Belloni 2008).
Our point of departure is somewhat different from these studies, in that we do not model
the exit decision, but concentrate on the labour market participation decisions of those who
decide to continue to be active on the labour market. That is those who are looking for
work or are working (as an employee). To set the scene, we summarise in the next table
the labour market participation figures and mean labour time of the subjects in the sample
that we will use in this paper, by age category (more specifically, 30–49 years compared to
50–64 years). Our sample consists of single males and females, and males and females living
together as a couple, who either execute a job as employee, be it full or part time, or are
available on the labour market to execute such a job, if they would find a suitable offer.3
1 The use of social security wealth as an indicator for financial incentives of the social security system,
can at least be traced back to Feldstein (1974).
2 See Maes (2011, 2012) and Lefebvre and Orsini (2012) for applications to Belgium. Maes uses the net
social security wealth and its accrual as inputs in the decision model, while Lefebvre and Orsini use simulated
paths of future wages and benefits. Applications to Italy were made by Belloni and Alessie (2009, 2013).
3 This excludes self–employed, early retired persons and persons receiving a sickness or invalidity benefit.
As such, the definition of participation rate we will use in this paper, that is the number of employed
persons relative to those employed and those available for executing a job, differs from both the employment
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The drop in labour market participation from those aged 30 to 49 years old to those aged
50 to 64 years old ranges between 12 (males in couples) and 31 percentage points (females
in couples). The time per week a person spends on jobs drops, comparing the same two age
categories, by almost six to more than ten hours per week.
labour market labour time
participation (%) mean hours per week
Age 30–49 50–64 30–49 50–64
Category
Males in couples 96% 84% 39.6 33.8
Females in couples 85% 54% 27.0 16.5
Single males 85% 62% 33.7 24.6
Single females 73% 58% 26.6 19.7
Source: own calculations on the basis of eu–silc 2007 Belgium.
We will investigate whether this lower participation of elderly is a matter of preferences
(increasing intensity of preference for leisure with age), or whether less jobs are available,
suitable for the capacities of elderly. Thereto a model is required which, contrary to the
classical discrete choice models of labour supply (Van Soest, 1995), will allow for the impact
of both labour supply and labour demand side effects.
More specifically, we used a Random Utility/Random Opportunity (ruro) model of job
choice (see amongst others Dagsvik and Strøm, 1992, 2003, Dagsvik, Aaberge and Strøm, 1995,
and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm, 1999).4 These type of models, first developed in an
abstract setting by Dagsvik (1994), try to understand individual heterogeneity in choice
behaviour as a combined effect of preference differences and differences in opportunities.
The ruromodel is not the only one that embodies restrictions on the choice set into a labour
supply model (see, amongst others, Altonji and Paxson 1982, 1992, Van Soest, Woittiez and
Kapteyn 1990, Tummers and Woittiez 1991, Dickens and Lundberg 1993, Bloemen 2000,
2008, Ham and Reilly 2002, and Beffy et al. 2014). It must be added that the inclusion of
dummies for part time and full time work in the discrete choice model of Van Soest (1995),
to improve the fit, is in fact a simplified reduced form approach of earlier work with Woittiez
and Kapteyn (Van Soest, Woittiez and Kateyn, 1990) which models hours restrictions more
explicitly. But the ruro model is the first one that derives these restrictions from an explicit
model of a job arrival process, and stresses the individual heterogeneity, both observed and
and activity rate in eurostat–statistics. The former is the number of persons working relative to total
population or the relevant sub–population, while the latter refers to those working and looking for a job,
compared to the total or relevant sub–population.
4 See also the recent overviews by Aaberge and Colombino (2014), and Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad, and
Thoresen (2014).
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unobserved, of the availability of job offers suitable to the capacities of individual agents.
This makes this model specially apt to handle the research question we envisage.
Preferences are capturing the extent to which an individual is willing to trade–off leisure
for consumption. It may deserve recommendation to take into account also other aspects
influencing the choice between alternative leisure activities and available jobs, such as so-
cial relations involved, challenge of the tasks, security and health, recognition, and societal
relevance. These factors are however not easily observable by the analyst. It was one of
the contributions of the development of probabilistic choice and random utility models, as
developed by respectively Luce (1959) and McFadden (1973), to integrate these additional
determinants of preferences as a non–systematic element, affecting the utility obtained from
different available alternatives. By non–systematic it is meant that such factors cannot be
traced back to observable characteristics. Random utility models have been applied to la-
bour supply behaviour (Van Soest, 1995) since. They replaced the traditional continuous
choice approach to labour supply behaviour (see Hausman, 1985, for a review of the tradi-
tional approach), which faced difficulties in deriving tractable closed form solutions of labour
supply functions, in the presence of non–linear budget sets. Indeed, many personal income
tax systems, such as e.g. a minimum income guarantee associated with a linear earned in-
come tax, create non–convexities in the budget set (the available bundles of consumption
and labour time a person can chose from), leading to discontinuities and non–uniqueness of
the optimal choice in function of wage variations. These phenomena are more easily treated
in a discrete choice set–up, which is the approach taken by both, probabilistic choice and
random utility models.
The random utility model is however still limited in scope. Interindividual differences in
the availability of alternatives from which a person can choose, are exogenous to the model.
Applied to job choice, differences in individual budget sets stem exclusively from wage dif-
ferences and differences in unearned income. In a static model, it is indeed reasonable to
assume that unearned income differences are exogenous, and do not depend on individual
choices. But in standard random utility models also wages are exogenously fixed individual
characteristics, reflecting a person’s productive capacities.5 For several reasons, this is un-
attractive. Productive capacities can in many cases not be determined appropriately, when
considered separately from the specific job in which these capacities are exhibited. Moreover,
5 Some contributions do allow for unobserved wage heterogeneity, see e.g. Van Soest, Das
and Gong (2002), Löffler et al. (2013), and the second model discussed in Dagsvik and Jia (2014). It is
fair to say that Van Soest (1995) already incorporated the problem of imperfect observation of wages for
non–participants in the extended version of his model. Besides, there is an earlier literature accounting for
the fact that wages are non–linear in hours (See for example Moffitt 1984). However, none of these treats
wages as an object of job choice behaviour.
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it is quite unnatural that all available job offers, even when perfectly suited to a person’s ca-
pacities and skills, would pay the same wage. Furthermore, due to organisational limitations
of the production process, and social life, it is highly unlikely that persons can completely
freely fix the number of hours they will work.
It is exactly these type of frictions in the choice process which are taken into consideration
by ruro models, as an additional factor, next to preferences, to understand choice beha-
viour. Job offers are considered as packages of wages, labour time regimes, and a number
of other attributes (Dagsvik and Strøm, 1992, 2003, Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm, 1995,
and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm, 1999). These other attributes (challenge, safety and
security, esteem and recognition, appreciation of colleagues, responsibility...) are however
difficult to observe, especially to the extent that these are important from the viewpoint of
the degree of job satisfaction they can provide to a person. Therefore, the individual specific
availability of suitable jobs is thought of as the result of a stochastic process of job offers.
The impact of explanatory variables on the intensity with which job offers arrive to a person
according to that process, is estimated jointly with individual’s preference characteristics.
Not only the intensity with which job offers arrive, but also the availability of, according to
a person’s own judgement, attractive non–market alternatives to spend time, is individually
specific. Limited physical abilities might impede someone who likes to walk outside, to do so.
Choosing under such circumstances between sitting in front of a liquid crystal screen, read-
ing books, or accepting a job, that person might opt for the latter, while the reverse might
happen for someone with similar preferences, but in good physical shape. The ruro–model
also allows for individual heterogeneity in restrictions on available labour time regimes, even
though the effect of these type of restrictions are difficult to identify from the contribution
of preferences.
The present paper exploits the distinction of the ruro model between preference factors and
individual differences in opportunities, in order to obtain a more nuanced picture of labour
market participation of the elderly. More specifically, by estimating a ruro model (applied
to Belgium) we are able to give a quantitative answer to the question to what extent lower
labour market participation is due to changing preferences (executing a job might become
less enjoyable with age) or differences in opportunities (elderly getting less, or less attractive
job offers).
For the interest reader, Section 2 presents a self–contained in depth exposition of our account
of the ruro model. Section 3 discusses the derivation of the likelihood function resulting
from the model, and explains, also in detail, the estimation method. Some technical issues
are relegated to an appendix. The data are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains
the estimation results. In Section 6 we investigate the fit of the estimated model, and its
behavioural implications. Finally, Section 7 draws some tentative conclusions with respect
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to the contribution of preferences and opportunities, in the assessment of the age profiles of
labour market participation.
2 The ruro model
In the present section, we present an application of the general ruro model (Dagsvik 1994)
to job choice behaviour. This job choice model was developed by Dagsvik and Strøm
(1992, 2003, and 2006), Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), Aaberge, Colombino and
Strøm (1999), Dagsvik, Locatelli and Strøm (2006, 2007), and Dagsvik and Jia (2014) (see
also the the surveys of Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad and Thoresen, 2014, and Aaberge and Colom-
bino, 2014). We first illustrate how the ruromodel extends the choice problem of traditional
labour supply models from a question of trading off leisure against consumption towards a
model of job choice, against other non–market alternatives of time use (Subsection 2.1).
Then, we discuss the preference part of the model (Subsection 2.2). Finally, we expose the
modelling of opportunities (Subsection 2.3).
2.1 Opportunities and jobs
In general, the ruro model is an economic model of human choice behaviour. Human
decision makers are assumed to choose the best element from a set of choice possibilities or
opportunities, where ‘best’ is defined in terms of preferences (or, vice versa, preferences are
derived from observed choice behaviour as that objective which would be maximised given
those choices). Applied to job choice, the set of opportunities is to be thought of as a set of
possible activities a particular individual might choose to execute. Some of these activities
are rendered available through job offers. These job offers will be indexed by j, where the
variable j belongs to an index set, J say. A job offer stipulates an amount of labour time
to be supplied when accepting the offer, say h, and pays a wage, w. It is assumed that this
wage can be expressed in units of time effectively spent on the job, so that (gross) revenues
earned by the job equal the amount of time spent on the job times the wage.6
Gross earned labour income is then equal to wh. Gross earned labour income together
with some other characteristics, say xf , among which unearned gross income (exclusive of
6 This is generally not the case. Output dependent bonuses or piece–rates do not necessarily bear an
obvious relation with time spent on the job. More surprisingly, in a regime with fixed monthly wages, the
wage per unit of time is variable, since the number of hours a regular (that is: full time) job requires can
differ over jobs, and for a specific job, the number of hours to be worked per month is not fixed. Finally, even
if there is a fixed hourly wage, and no bonuses, there is no obvious way how to treat paid holidays. Should
they be taken into account when calculating an hourly wage or not? When taking these into account, this
would result in an increase of the gross hourly wage, as compared to the wage specified in the contract.
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transfers), determine the outcome of the gross to net (disposable) income function c =
f (w, h;xf ), where c stands for consumption which in a static model as the present one
coincides with gross disposable income.7 That is, saving is considered as part of consumption.
The function f converts gross income components into net disposable income, by subtracting
taxes to be paid and adding transfers and subsidies. Usually, the generation of disposable
income is constructed from raw data on gross income, labour time and other characteristics,
by means of a microsimulation model.
Besides time spent on the job and the remuneration, jobs exhibit a number of other character-
istics such as degree of responsibility, variation and challenge of the tasks, safety, healthiness,
physical effort, stress, relation with colleagues and superiors. These characteristics will be
denoted by s. Preferences over these non–pecuniary attributes affect job choice.
One might also decline all job offers. Evidently, not executing a formal job does not require
any time to be spent on the formal labour market (h = 0), and is assumed not to pay a
wage (w = 0).8 A person who does not work, receives a net transfer (that is after deducting
income taxes to be paid from her replacement income) equal to f (0, 0;xf ). In that case,
time is spent on executing some of the available non–market opportunities. However the set
of activities9 one has alternatively available is not the same for all individuals, neither is the
extent to which a particular alternative is available. When living in a small town, attending
concerts, theatre or visiting museums is certainly not as easy as for big city dwellers. If you
are in a wheel chair, hiking is not an option. Which of the available non–market activities
will be chosen, in case no job offer is accepted, again depends on preferences (or, vice versa,
what one chooses to do allows to derive something on the shape of preferences that person
supposedly has). Non–market alternatives will be indexed by i, belonging to the index set I.
The index set for jobs and non–market alternatives respectively, are disjoint: I ∩ J = ∅.
We will also use the index variable z to indicate an alternative in general, that is either a job
or a non–market alternative. So, z ∈ Z := I ∪ J . To be really precise, and index z refers
to a set of activities. If this set involves one or more jobs, it the index z will belong to I,
while it belongs to J otherwise. So, an alternative z involves a set of activities. We will be
somewhat sloppy in the sequel however, by calling an alternative involving one or more jobs
in the formal labour market, sometimes simply a job.
7 We include the gross wage, and the number of hours worked as separate arguments in that function,
as some aspects of the tax system, such as the Belgian work bonus may depend on the wage, rather than
on labour income, wh. We are however aware that this might cause problems for the non–parametric
identification of the ruro model.
8 How to treat informal jobs in this type of framework remains largely an unresolved question.
9 The word ‘activity’ will be used here in a broad sense, including occupations which are not very ‘active’
such as sleeping and day dreaming. A certain type of agency or control is however presumed, since otherwise
it would be difficult to talk about choice behaviour.
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2.2 Random utility
In the model, preferences are defined over the number of hours h spent on jobs (which is
zero if one chooses not to accept any job offer), consumption, c, and a set of other attributes,
say s, that a job or certain non–market activities possess, and that a person might care for.
These other attributes are not observed by the researcher.
The observable, and thus from a behaviour theoretic point of view relevant, bundle of char-
acteristics an alternative z ∈ Z exhibits, is denoted by (C (z) , H (z)), where C (z) refers to
the individually specific net disposable income associated with executing activities involved
by z, and H (z) to the labour time involved by the set of activities involved by z. The
utility derived from these observable characteristics is denoted by V (C (z) , T −H (z) ;x
V
),
where x
V
are the specific values of a set preference shifters for the individual under consid-
eration, and T denotes the number of time units available in the period over which labour
time h is registered (e.g. 168 hours a week, if labour time is expressed in hours worked per
week). Alternatively, one may define preferences over consumption and leisure. The latter,
say `, is equal to the time left over for non–market activities, after subtracting labour time,
` := T − h. It is assumed that the econometrician can derive some evidence on the shape
of the function V on the basis of observations on (c, T − h) and x
V
. So, no individual pref-
erence differences apart from those explained by observable characteristics x
V
, are allowed
for in this part of the utility function, and V is therefore called the systematic part of the
utility function, and, hence, of preferences.
Since the other attributes besides disposable income and labour time are not observable,
their contribution to utility will be specified as a random term. Thus, when a set of activ-
ities z bears attributes s = s (z), the utility these attributes generate, is denoted by the
random variable ε (s (z)). So, each individual derives a specific utility from an activity z
with attributes s = s (z), and this utility is considered as the realisation of a random vari-
able. Different realisations of these terms (one for each value s could take) thus incorporate
unobserved individual preference heterogeneity. It is assumed that this utility from non–
pecuniary attributes, ε (s (z)), enters overall utility of an alternative z, in a multiplicatively
separable way from the systematic part of the utility function. In order to make sense, this
requires both, the systematic part of the utility, and the random term, to be non–negatively
valued functions.
In summary, the total utility derived from picking an alternative z ∈ Z, denoted by
U (C (z) , H (z) , s (z) ;x
V
), equals:
U (C (z) , H (z) , s (z) ;x
V
) := V (C (z) , T −H (z) ;x
V
) ·ε (s (z)) . (1)
Now, since c = f (w, h;xf ), the systematic part of the utility function, V (c, T − h;xV ),
implicitly defines a utility function, say Ψ, defined over hours worked on the formal labour
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market, h, and wage, w:
Ψ (w, h;x
V
,xf ) := V (f (w, h;xf ) , T − h;xV ) . (2)
Consequently, we can define preferences also in the space of hours of work, wage, and other
attributes, as follows:
U (f (W (z) , H (z) ;xf ) , H (z) , s (z) ;xV ) := Ψ (W (z) , H (z) ;xV ,xf ) ·ε (s (z)) , (3)
where W (z) is the wage paid by activity z. More in particular, for someone not accepting
any job offer, and choosing to an alternative i ∈ I which exhibits characteristics s (i), the
utility equals:
U (0, 0, s (i) ;x
V
) = Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) ·ε (s (i)) . (4)
The domain of the systematic part of the utility function in the hours–wage space, Ψ (· ;x
V
,xf , I),
is [0, T ]× [0,∞).
2.3 Random opportunities
Both, jobs and non–market activities, are not equally available to all individuals. This
is captured by the notion of intensity with which alternatives are rendered available to a
specific individual. The probability to receive a job offer as a civil engineer, for someone who
has only completed secondary school, is e.g. zero. Something similar holds for non–market
activities: they are not all equally available to all agents. Someone having lost her legs will
not be able to run (or not in the same fashion as before), though she might continue to be
fond of it. In Appendix I we provide a brief introduction to the type of stochastic process
that describes the degree to which job offers and non–market alternatives become available
to an individual, and which is known as an inhomogeneous spatial Poisson process.
The intensity with which a job is offered to an individual depends on a number of personal
characteristics, such as skills, education, experience, and on the characteristics of the job
itself, more specifically, the wage, the labour time regime of the job, and its other attributes.
In equation (3), preferences were defined over the continuous set of all possible amounts of
time spent on the jobs. In the real world, however, jobs requiring a non–rational number
of hours a week, are not available. Be it alone to organise the production process, it might
sometimes be required to have a number of people working together during a fixed number of
hours. So, in practice, full–time, three–quarter time and half time, one–quarter, or 20% jobs
are more densely offered. Let g2 (h;xg2) be the intensity with which jobs requiring h hours of
labour supply, are rendered available to an individual with characteristics xg2 . Similarly, jobs
pay different wages, and personal characteristics can co-determine the intensity of job offers
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that pay on average higher wages. Let g1 (w |h ;xg1) be the intensity with which, among the
job offers requiring h hours of work, those paying a wage equal to w, are rendered available
to a person with characteristics xg1 .
Persons do not only care for the wages a job pays, and the number of hours to be worked,
but also for the other attributes of a job. From a behavioural theoretic point of view
(see equation 1), these are only important in as far as they yield a specific value for the
multiplication factor in the utility function for those alternatives. Two jobs, j1 and j2 say,
paying the same wage and requiring the same amount of hours, with attributes yielding the
same value of the multiplication factor in the utility function for those alternatives, that is
ε (s (j1)) = ε (s (j2)), are thus, according to the behavioural model of equation (1), equivalent
to each other in the present model, and therefore will be considered as the same opportunity.
The intensity with which job offers arrive which yield a value for the multiplication factor
in the utility function equal to 1, is denoted by λ1 (1;xq). In this function, xq refers to a
set of personal characteristics that determine intensity with which job offers arrive to that
person.10 We explicitly included age in these characteristics, in order to assess potential age
differentials in the intensity of job offers. This job offer intensity is reflected in a function pi1,
which is assumed to have range (0, 1). We assume the following functional form for λ1:
λ1 (1;xq) =
pi1 (xq)
(1)
2
. (5)
This functional form implies that attributes which are particularly disliked (yield a zero or
very small value for 1) are excessively abundant, while those that are particularly liked
(yielding a very high value of 1), are extremely scarce, irrespective of personal characterist-
ics xq. These affect the level of λ1 for all values of ε1.
The distinguishing value of different potential non–market activities, is completely absorbed
by the different values of the multiplication factor in the utility function they generate.
Indeed, the systematic part of the utility function is for all non–market alternatives equal to
Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ). As for jobs with the same wage and required labour input, two non–market
activities, i1 and i2 say, with attributes yielding the same value of the multiplication factor in
the utility function for those alternatives, that is ε (s (i1)) = ε (s (i2)), are from a behavioural
theoretic point of view equivalent to each other, and will therefore be considered as one and
the same opportunity. Similarly as for jobs, it will be assumed that leisure activities which
are particularly disliked, are abundantly available, while those that are intensely desired, are
10 The use of the sub–index q for those characteristics will become clear later when we introduce the
q–function as the proportion of the intensity of job offers relative to the degree of availability of non–market
alternatives. In short, job offer arrivals depend on personal capacities and skills which are subdivided in
those apt to execute formal jobs, and those more suited for performing leisure activities. Next there may be
personal characteristics on the basis of which discrimination in job offers by employers might take place.
9
rather difficult to obtain. Also, personal characteristics, the same as those having an impact
on the intensity with which jobs are offered, xq, are influencing the relative availability
of non–market alternatives, and this is measured by the function pi0 (xq). The intensity
with which non–market activities yielding a multiplication factor equal to 0, denoted by
λ0 (0;xq), are accessible to an individual with characteristics xq, is thus assumed to be
equal to:
λ0 (0;xq) =
pi0 (xq)
(0)
2
. (6)
It will be assumed that the effect of these characteristics on the availability of non–market
runs in the reverse direction as that on job offer intensity.11
Consequently, the intensity with which non–market activities yielding a utility level larger
than or equal to u0, are rendered available to an individual with characteristics xq, denoted
by Λ0 (Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) 0 ≥ u0;xq), is equal to:
Λ0 (Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) 0 ≥ u0;xq) =
∫∞
u0/Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
pi0(xq)
(0)
2
d 0
= pi0 (xq)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
u0
.
(7)
If one assumes that Λ0 is the intensity measure of a Poisson process, then the number
of non–market alternatives that yield a utility level of at least u0, available to a person
with characteristics (x
V
,xf ,xq), is Poisson distributed (see Appendix I). Let the num-
ber of available non–market activities yielding a utility level of at least u0, be denoted
by N (Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) 0 ≥ u0). The probability that N (Ψ (0, 0;xV ,xf ) 0 ≥ u0) = n, is, ac-
cording to the Poisson distribution, equal to:
P (N (Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) 0 ≥ u0 = n;xq))=(Λ
0(Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)0≥u0;xq))
n
exp[−Λ0(Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)0≥u0;xq)]
n!
=
(pi0(xq)Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)/u0)
n
exp[−pi0(xq)Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)/u0]
n!
.
(8)
The higher the intensity measure Λ0, the more skewed to the right this distribution becomes,
that is, the higher the probability that the number of available non–market alternatives yield
a utility level of at least u0 is relatively big.
In the present case, the process is inhomogeneous, since the degree of availability of non–
market alternatives depends on the utility value they yield, while in an ordinary Poisson
11 As a matter of normalisation it will thus be imposed that pi0 (xq) + pi1 (xq) ≡ 1.
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process this is a constant parameter. The probability that all available non–market altern-
atives yield a utility level lower than u0, equals the probability that the number of available
alternatives with utility larger than or equal to u0, is zero:
P (Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) 0 < u0;xq) = P (N (Ψ (0, 0;xV ,xf ) 0 ≥ u0) = 0;xq)
= exp [−Λ0 (Ψ (0, 0;x
V
,xf ) 0 ≥ u0;xq)]
= exp [−pi0 (xq) Ψ (0, 0;xV ,xf )/u0] .
(9)
From the last equation, it can be concluded that the utility that can be derived from the avail-
able non–market alternatives, which is a stochastic variable equal to υ0 := Ψ (0, 0;x,y, I) 0,
is Fréchet distributed with location parameter µ = 0, scale parameter σ0 (xV ,xf ,xq) =
pi0 (xq) Ψ (0, 0;xV ,xf ), and shape parameter α = 1.12 This will prove useful when deriving
the likelihood function in the next section (Section 3.1).
Let H be the set of all possible labour time regimes of jobs offered in the market, and W
the set of possible wage offers. Wages can obtain any positive value. Let B := Bh × Bw
be the Cartesian product of a measurable subset of labour time regimes Bh ⊆ H, and wage
offers Bw = (0, w), for some positive w. Analogously to the modelling of the availability
of non–market opportunities, the arrival of job offers13 to a person exhibiting characterist-
ics (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq), is modelled by an inhomogeneous spatial Poisson process. Events
are job offers that are characterised by a labour time regime, a wage offer, and the utility
that can be derived from other attributes. The intensity parameter of this Poisson process
will be denoted by Λ1 (B, u; (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq). This parameter reflects the intensity with
which jobs paying a wage r lower than w (that is r ∈ Bw), and specifying a working time
regime t in Bh, and which will yield a utility level at least equal to u, are rendered available
to a person with characteristics (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq), and it is defined as:
Λ1(B, u;x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) :=
∫
t∈Bh
g2 (t;xg2)
∫
r∈Bw
g1 (r |t ;xg1)
∞∫
u/Ψ(t,r;xV ,xf)
pi1(xq)
( 1)
2
d1 dr dt
=
∫
t∈Bh g2(t;xg2)
∫
r∈Bw g1(r|t ;xg1)pi1(xq)Ψ(t,r;xV ,xf) dr dt
u
.
(10)
Let N (B, u) be the number of job offers with a wage r belonging to Bw, the number of hours
to be worked in Bh, and yielding a utility level larger than or equal to u. The probability
12 In general, the class of Fréchet distributions is defined as: F (x;µ, σ, α) := exp
[
− (x−µσ )−α], where µ is
a location parameter, σ a scale parameter, and α is a shape parameter. We could alternatively argue that
the multiplier in the utility function, stemming from the attractiveness of the non–pecuniary attributes of
non–market alternatives to a particular individual with characteristics (x
V
,xf ,xq), is Fréchet distributed
with location parameter µ = 0, scale parameter σ = pi0 (xq), and shape parameter α = 1.
13 As mentioned before, a ‘job offer is a short hand for ‘an alternative containing at least one job offer’.
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for an individual with characteristics (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) to be offered n such jobs is then
equal to:
P (N (B, u) = n;x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) =
(Λ1(B,u;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq))
n
exp[−Λ1(B,u;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)]
n!
.
(11)
Let P (UB ≤ u) be the probability that all job offers with wages in Bw, and number of hours
to be worked in Bh, yield a utility level less than u. This is equal to the probability that there
are no job offers available that pay wages and specifying a working time in these ranges, and
which yield a utility level of at least u:
P (UB ≤ u;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) = P (N (B, u) = 0;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
= exp [−Λ1 (B, u;x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)]
= exp
[
−
∫
t∈Bh g2(t;xg2)
∫
r∈Bw g1(r|t ;xg1)pi1(xq)Ψ(t,r;xV ,xf) dr dt
u
]
.
(12)
The utility level that can be obtained from jobs with working time and wage combinations
in B, which is a stochastic variable, denoted as UB, and which is governed by the stochastic
process of job offers arriving to an individual, is thus Fréchet distributed with location
parameter µ = 0, scale parameter
σB (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) =
∫
t∈Bh
g1 (t;xg1)
∫
r∈Bw
g2 (r |t ;xg2) pi1 (xq) Ψ (t, r;xV ,xf ) d r d t,
and shape parameter α = 1.
The derivation of this distribution is equally valid for any (measurable) subset B of the space
of possible working times and wage combinations job offers might exhibit. More in particular,
it holds for the complement of B in the set of all possible working time wage combinations,
defined as Bc := Bch×Bcw = H\Bh×[w,∞). It follows that the random variable UBc , denoting
the utility level derivable from possible job offers with working time wage combinations in Bc,
is Fréchet distributed with location parameter µ = 0, scale parameter
σBc (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) =
∫
t∈Bch
g2 (t;xg2)
∫
r∈Bcw
g1 (r |t ;xg1) pi1 (xq) Ψ (t, r;xV ,xf ) d r d t,
and shape parameter α = 1.
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3 Likelihood function, functional form, and estimation
3.1 Derivation of the likelihood
Now we turn to the behavioural implications of the model explained in Section 2. From the
available job offers and non–market opportunities, a person will choose that alternative she
likes most. The probability that this will be an alternative including a job offer with a working
time wage combination in the set B, is equal to the probability that UB ≥ max {U0, UBc}.
This can be calculated as follows. From the in the previous section derived distribution of
the utility levels resulting from the stochastic process governing the arrival of job offers and
non–market opportunities, it follows that the probability that UBc (the utility from a job
offer with a labour time and wage combination in Bc) will be smaller than some non–negative
number u, is equal to:
P (UBc ≤ u;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) =
u∫
0
σBc(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
(v)2
exp
[
−σBc(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)v
]
d v
= exp
[
−σBc(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
u
]
.
(13)
Similarly (see equation 9), the probability that U0 (the utility from the available non–market
alternatives) will be smaller than u, is equal to:
P (U0 ≤ u;xV ,xf ,xq) =
u∫
0
σ0(xV ,xf ,xq)
(v)2
exp
[
−σ0(xV ,xf ,xq)v
]
d v
= exp
[
−σ0(xV ,xf ,xq)
u
]
.
(14)
As the processes governing the arrival of job offers and non–market opportunities are assumed
to be independent, the probability that UB (the utility from a job offer with a labour time and
wage combination in B) is equal to or greater than max {U0, UBc} is equal to the product of
the probability that UB is greater than or equal to U0 and the probability that UB is greater
than or equal to UBc . That is: the product of the probability that U0 is smaller than a
certain non–negative value u and the probability that UBc is smaller than that same value u,
evaluating that joint probability weighted by the likelihood that UB takes on the value u,
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and integrating this over all possible values u that UB could assume:
P (UB ≥ max {U0, UBc} ;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) =
∞∫
0
σB(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
(u)2
exp
[
−
σB(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
u
]
exp
[
−
σBc(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
u
]
exp
[
−
σ0(xV ,xf ,xq)
u
]
du
=
∞∫
0
σB(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
(u)2
exp
[
−
(
σB(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)+σBc(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)+σ0(xV ,xf ,xq)
u
)]
du
=
σB(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)
σB(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)+σBc(xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) +σ0(xV ,xf ,xq)
=
∫
t∈Bh g2(t;xg2)
∫
r∈Bw g1(r|t ;xg1)pi1(xq)Ψ(t,r;xV ,xf) d r d t
pi0(xq)Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∫
t∈H g2(t;xg2)
∫
r∈W g1(r|t ;xg1)pi1(xq)Ψ(t,r;xV ,xf) d r d t
.
(15)
In a similar fashion it can be derived that the probability to choose a non–market alternative,
is equal to the probability that U0 is equal to or greater than UB∪Bc , which is equal to:
P (U0 ≥ UB∪Bc ;xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) =
pi0(xq)Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
pi0(xq)Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∫
t∈H g2(t;xg2)
∫
r∈W g1(r|t ;xg1)pi1(xq)Ψ(t,r;xV ,xf) d r d t
.
(16)
We noted before that the model assumes that the characteristics xq which influence the
intensity with which job offers arrive to a person endowed with those characteristics, are the
same as those affecting the degree of availability of non–market alternatives, but acting in the
opposite direction. Equations (15) and (16) make clear that this is necessary for identifying
the model. Indeed, the same result would be obtained when dividing through the numerator
and denominator by pi0 (xq). We therefore introduce the notion of relative intensity with
which job offers arrive, as compared to the degree to which non–market alternatives are
available:
q (xq) :=
pi1 (xq)
pi0 (xq)
. (17)
Estimating the parameters of this function, and assuming that 0 ≤ pii (xq) ≤ 1 for all xq,
and i = 0, 1, and pi1 (xq) + pi0 (xq) = 1, will allow then to recover both pi1 (xq) and pi0 (xq).
An additional assumption for identification is the independence of the wage offer distribution
from the hours specified by the job offers. That is g1 (w |h;xg1 ) = g1 (w;xg1), ∀h ∈ H.
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The likelihood14 that a person with characteristics (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) will choose one par-
ticular job offer requiring labour time h, and paying a wage w, can thus be written as:
ϕ (w, h; (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)) =
Ψ(w,h;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(w;xg1)g2(h;xg2)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∫
s∈W
∫
t∈H
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2) d t d s
, (18)
Similarly, the likelihood her most preferred non–market alternative is preferred to any of the
job offers, equals:
ϕ (0, 0; (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)) =
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∫
s∈W
∫
t∈H
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2) d t d s
. (18’)
Up to now, we exclusively concentrated on individual decision makers. The model is easily
extended to the case of households consisting of couples (with or without children), if one is
willing to assume a unitary decision making model. More specifically, it is assumed that both
partners have identical tastes specified over household consumption, each of the partners’
leisure time, and other attributes associated with the activities the partners executed. If
one assumes that each partner’s process of job offer arrivals and availability of non–market
alternatives is independent of that of the other, one arrives at the following expressions for
the likelihood that both partners, respectively, only one of them, or none of both, will accept
a job offer:
ϕ
(
w1, h1, w2, h2;
(
x
V
,xf ,xgj1
,xgj2
,xqj ; j = 1, 2
))
=
Ψ(w1,h1,w2,h2;xV ,xf)
∏
j=1,2
qj(xqj )g
j
1
(
wj ;x
g
j
1
)
gj2
(
hj ;x
g
j
2
)
Ψ(0,0,0,0;xV ,xf) +A+B+C
,
ϕ
(
w1, h1, 0, 0;
(
x
V
,xf ,xgj1
,xgj2
,xqj ; j = 1, 2
))
=
Ψ(w1,h1,0,0;xV ,xf)q
1(xq1)g
1
1
(
w1;xg11
)
g12
(
h1;xg12
)
Ψ(0,0,0,0;xV ,xf) +A+B+C
,
ϕ
(
0, 0, w2, h2;
(
x
V
,xf ,xgj1
,xgj2
,xqj ; j = 1, 2
))
=
Ψ(0,0,w2,h2;xV ,xf)q
2(xq2)g
2
1
(
w2;xg21
)
g22
(
h2;xg22
)
Ψ(0,0,0,0;xV ,xf) +A+B+C
,
ϕ
(
0, 0, 0, 0;
(
x
V
,xf ,xgj1
,xgj2
,xqj ; j = 1, 2
))
=
Ψ(0,0,0,0;xV ,xf)
Ψ(0,0,0,0;xV ,xf) +A+B+C
,
(18”)
14 We use the term likelihood, though, in econometrics, the likelihood would express this as function of
the parameters of the model to be estimated.
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with:
A :=
∫
s1∈W
∫
t1∈H
Ψ (s1, t1, 0, 0;xV ,xf ) q
1
(
xq1
)
g11
(
s1;xg11
)
g12
(
t1;xg12
)
d t1 d s1,
B :=
∫
s2∈W
∫
t2∈H
Ψ (0, 0, s2, t2;xV ,xf ) q
2
(
xq2
)
g21
(
s2;xg21
)
g22
(
t2;xg22
)
d t2 d s2,
C :=
∫
s1∈W
∫
t1∈H
∫
s2∈W
∫
t2∈H
Ψ (s1, t1, s2, t2;xV ,xf )
∏
j=1,2
qj
(
xqj
)
gj1
(
sj ;xgj1
)
gj2
(
tj ;xgj2
)
dt2 ds2 dt1 d s1.
where qj, gji (i = 1, 2) are the relative intensity of job offers, the wage offer density, and the
labour time density of partner j (j = 1, 2). For couples, the non–market alternative is that
alternative in which none of both partners is engaged in the formal labour market.
3.2 Functional forms
In the present section we present the functional forms of the different components of the
model that will be used in the empirical application in Section 5.
At the preference side,
– the systematic part of the log utility function for singles is of the Box–Cox type15:
lnV (c, T − h;x
V
) = βc ·
(
cαc−1
αc
)
+(β′hxV ) ·
(
((T−h)/T )αh−1
αh
)
, with αc, αh < 1. Intensity
of preferences for leisure is increasing (decreasing) in an element of x
V
, if the associated
parameter of βh is positive (negative).16 The exponents, αc and αh, determine the
curvature of the indifference curves in terms of labour time and consumption. The
lower these are, the less substitutable leisure and consumption are;
– for couples, a unitary decision model is assumed, but spouses’ leisure time is con-
sidered to be an assignable good. So, preferences are defined over consumption and
each spouse’s leisure time. Partner’s time endowments are equal. An interaction term
capturing potential complementarities between partners’ leisure time is added to the
utility function:
lnV (c, T − h1, T − h2;xV ) = βc,g ·
(
cαc,g−1
αc,g
)
+
∑
i=1,2
(
β′hixV
) · ( ((T−hi)/T )αhi−1
αhi
)
+
βh1,h2 ·
∏
i=1,2
(
((T−hi)/T )αhi−1
αhi
)
,
with αc,g, αhi < 1 (i = 1, 2). The interpretation of the exponents and the β
′
hi
(i = 1, 2)
remains the same as for singles; in addition, βh1,h2 > (<)0 means that partners’ leisure
are complements (substitutes).
15 For a justification, see Dagsvik and Røine Hoff (2011), and Dagsvik (2013).
16 More details are provided in Section 5.1.
16
At the opportunity side,
– the log of the intensity of job offers relative to the availability of non–market altern-
atives is linear in the covariates: ln q (xq) = η′qxq. The vector xq should contain a
constant term, and the associated coefficient is denoted by ηq,0;
– the wage density g1 (w;xg1) is assumed to be lognormal:
g1 (w;xg1) =
1
w·σ·√2pi exp
(
−1
2
(
lnw−δ′g1xg1
σ
)2)
; and
– the distribution of the labour time regimes offered, is piecemeal uniform.17 There are
a number of, say K, peaks, indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . , K, around which the bulk of the
job offers’ labour time regimes are concentrated (typically around half time, that is
18.5 to 20.5 hour a week in our application, three quarter time, or 29.5 to 30.5 hours
a week, and full time, or 37.5 to 40.5 hours). The lower and upper bound of peak k
(k = 1, 2, . . . , K) are denoted by respectively Hk andHk. There is a lower limit, Hmin,
below which job offers are not considered to belong to the formal labour market (fixed
at one hour a week in the application below); and an upper limit of labour time spent
on formal jobs, denoted by Hmax, and fixed at 70 hours per week in our application.
This results in the following density function:
g2 (h;xg2) =

γ1 if h ∈ [Hmin, H1[ , h ∈
[
Hk, Hk+1
[
, or h ∈
[
H
K
, Hmax
[
,
k = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1,
γ1 exp γk+1 if h ∈
[
Hk,Hk
[
, k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
The only covariate influencing this function will thus be the sex of the person. An
example of such a distribution function is given in Figure 1.
17 This makes that hours restrictions in the job offers have formally a similar implication as including
dummies for part time and full time work in a discrete choice labour supply model, as was proposed already
in the seminal paper of Van Soest (1995).
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Figure 1: Peak distribution for labour time regimes
1-18.5 18.5-20.5 29.5-30.5 37.5-40.5 40.5-70
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
Labour time regime of the job offer (hours per week)
 1 2exp 
 1 3exp 
 1 4exp 
111 1
3.3 Estimation
To estimate the parameters governing preferences, the relative intensity of market over non–
market alternatives, and the distribution of wage offers and labour time regimes, a likelihood
function, say L, is constructed on the basis of equations (18), (18’) and (18”). The individual
contributions of a single to that likelihood function are indeed composed of the likelihood that
the observed choice is the most preferred one, reflected in equations (18), or (18’), depending
on whether the observed choice involves participation on the formal labour market executing
a job (or set of jobs) requiring h hours of work, and paying a wage w, or whether it is the
non–market alternative. In these expressions, the numerator is thus evaluated at the actually
observed choice, when constructing the likelihood function. Similarly, for couples the first,
second, third, or fourth equation in (18”) applies, dependent on whether both partners, only
partner j (j = 1, 2), or none of both actually are engaged in formal jobs.
In practice, we do not observe the set of wage offers, W , nor the offered labour time re-
gimes, H. Therefore, a set of alternatives in the space of wages and labour time regimes is
sampled from a prior density function, say P (w, h;xP). This prior may be individually spe-
cific through its possible dependence on the covariates xP. Denote the set of sampled combin-
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ations of wage offers and labour time regimes, possibly including the non–market alternative,
by D. The observed choice (wobs, hobs ) is to be always included in the sampled choice set.
From the sampling densities P (w, h;xP), the likelihood to sample a set D given that the ob-
served choice equals
(
wobs, hobs
)
can be constructed. 18 It is denoted by P (D ∣∣(wobs, hobs )),
and it equals:
P (D ∣∣(wobs, hobs )) := ∏
i:(wi,hi)∈D
P (wi, hi;xP)
P (wobs, hobs ;xP)
. (19)
Recall that the probability (density) that a job paying a wage w, and requiring a number
of h hours to be worked, would be optimal given a choice set C := {0, 0} ∪ W × H, was
derived in equations (18), and (18’) if the non–market alternative would be the most preferred
option. The unconditional probability to sample a choice set D, denoted by Π (D), can thus
be written as19:
Π (D) =
∑
i:(wi,hi)∈D
P (D |(wi, hi))ϕ (wi, hi; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq)) . (20)
Using Bayes’ law, the probability (density) to observe an agent choosing a job offer that
pays a wage wi and requires hi hours of labour time from the sampled set D, thus equals:
ϕ˜ (wi, hi; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D ) =
P (D |(wi, hi))ϕ (wi, hi; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq))
Π (D) . (21)
Using equations (19) and (20), we can thus reformulate the simulated likelihood to observe
someone choosing an alternative (w, h) from a choice set D sampled according to the prior
P (w, h;xP), as:
ϕ˜ (w, h; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D )
=
Ψ(w,h;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(w;xg1)g2(h;xg2)/P(w,h;xP)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
P(0,0;xP)
+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf) q(xq)g1(s;xg1 )g2(t;xg2 )
P(s,t;xP)
=
Ψ(w,h;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(w;xg1)g2(h;xg2)
P(0,0;xP)
P(w,h;xP)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2)
P(0,0;xP)
P(s,t;xP)
.
(22)
18 The issue of sampling choice sets for estimating the ruro model is discussed more in detail in Appendix
II, and in McFadden (1978), Ben–Akiva and Lerman (1985), Aaberge, Columbino and Wennemo (2009),
Train (2009), and Lemp and Kockelman (2012).
19 For simplicity of notation, we drop the arguments (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq) that might influence the shape
of Π (D).
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The corresponding expression for choosing the non–market alternative equals:
ϕ˜ (0, 0; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D )
=
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2)
P(0,0;xP)
P(s,t;xP)
.
(22’)
Some further issues are in order. First, note that the constant term of the q (xq)–function,
exp (ηq,0), occurs in any term of the likelihood where γ1 appears (that is, in those terms of
the sum pertaining to a job offer on the formal labour market, (w, h) : w, h > 0), and each
time these terms appear as a product. Therefore both, ηq,0 and γ1, cannot be estimated
separately. But γ1 is still identified by the definition:
γ1
(
Hmax −HK +
∑K−1
k=1
(
Hk+1 −Hk
)
+H1 −Hmin +
∑K
k=1
(
Hk −Hk
)
exp γk
)
≡ 1. (23)
This means in practice that one does not estimate all the parameters in the likelihood (22)
(respectively 22’), but rather reduces these equations to:
ϕ˜ (w, h; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D )
=
Ψ(w,h;xV ,xf)q˜(xq)g1(w;xg1)g2(h;xg2)
P(0,0;xP)
P(w,h;xP)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q˜(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2)
P(0,0;xP)
P(s,t;xP)
,
(24)
where:
g2 (h;xg2) =
g2(h;xg2)
γ1
,
q˜ (xq) = γ1q (xq) .
For the likelihood to choose a non–market alternative, this becomes:
ϕ˜ (0, 0; (xV ,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D )
=
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q˜(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2)
P(0,0;xP)
P(s,t;xP)
,
(24’)
Secondly, as far as (some parts of) the probability to sample a job offer, that is an altern-
ative (w, h) such that w, h > 0, is (are) independent of the specific value of either w, or h,
or both, one can drop that part from the likelihood, and it will be absorbed by the constant
term of the q (xq)–function. For example, assume wages are sampled from a lognormal dis-
tribution with parameters µ and ς, labour time is sampled from the uniform distribution
on the [Hmin, Hmax)–interval, and the probability to sample non–market alternatives is the
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observed inactivity degree in the sample (that is the relative number of persons in the sample
being engaged in formal jobs for less than one hour a week), say piobs0 .20 That is:
P (w, h;xP) = piobs0 if (w, h) = (0, 0) ,
=
(
1− piobs0
) (wς√2pi)−1 exp(− (lnw−µ)22ς2 )
Hmax−Hmin if w > 0, h ∈ [Hmin, Hmax[ ,
= 0 otherwise.
(25)
The factor pi
obs
0
(1−piobs0 )
(Hmax −Hmin) occurs then in all terms of the likelihood for which w, h >
0. Suppose now that one drops this factor from the likelihood and estimates on the basis of:
ϕ˜ (w, h; (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D )
=
Ψ(w,h;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(w;xg1)g2(h;xg2)ς exp
(
(lnw−µ)2
2ς2
)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2)ς exp
(
(ln s−µ)2
2ς2
2
) ,
(26)
where:
g1 (w;xg1) = w
√
2pig1 (w;xg1) ,
g2 (h;xg2) =
g2(h;xg2)
γ1
,
q (xq) = γ1 (Hmax −Hmin) pi
obs
0
(1−piobs0 )
q (xq) = (Hmax −Hmin) pi
obs
0
(1−piobs0 )
q˜ (xq) .
For the non–market alternative, we obtain:
ϕ˜ (0, 0; (x
V
,xf ,xg1 ,xg2 ,xq,xP) |D )
=
Ψ(0,0hxV ,xf)
Ψ(0,0;xV ,xf)+
∑
(s,t)∈D\{(0,0)}
Ψ(s,t;xV ,xf)q(xq)g1(s;xg1)g2(t;xg2)ς exp
(
(ln s−µ)2
2ς2
) . (26’)
This means that using equations (26)–(26’) in the constructon of the likelihood function,
would yield exactly the same estimates as using equations (24)–(24’), except for the (mul-
tiplicative) constant term of q˜ (xq) in (24)–(24’), which provides an estimate of γ1 exp ηq,0,
while in equations (26)–(26’), the (multiplicative) constant of q (xq) is an estimate of
γ1 (Hmax −Hmin) pi
obs
0
(1−piobs0 )
exp ηq,0.
In both cases, one is able to back out an estimate of η0,q by using equation (23). In the first
case, one subtracts ln γ̂1 (with γ̂1, the estimated value of γ1 from applying equation (23)
using the estimates for γk+1, for k = 1, 2, . . . , K) from the estimated constant of ln (q˜ (xq)).
In the second case, ln
(
γ̂1 (Hmax −Hmin) pi
obs
0
(1−piobs0 )
)
needs to be subtracted from the estimated
constant of ln
(
q (xq)
)
.
20 That is the procedure that we will actually follow, with piobs0 = .104, µ = 2.71, and ς = .308 for males,
and the corresponding number for females are .246, 2.63, and .297.
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The estimates reported below in Table 3 are inclusive of γ1, but do not contain the sampling
correction terms. That is, we used specification (24)–(24’).
3.4 Simulation
In order to evaluate the fit of the estimates, or the estimated model’s prediction of behavi-
oural reactions to changes in explanatory variables, a simulation method is used. A choice
set is drawn (possibly capturing changes in the intensity with which certain alternatives
become available to certain persons) and then it is determined what an agent’s best choice
would be within this simulated choice set, according to the estimated preferences of that
person. If simulation is used for evaluating the fit of the estimated model, then the choice
set is drawn according to the model estimates (the relative intensity of job offers, the wage
offer distribution, and the labour time regime offers), and the simulated choices from that set
are to be compared with actual ones, as observed in the data. This is done in Figures 7–12
below (Section 6.1). Next we will use the simulation method also for calculating elasticities,
and to evaluate some counterfactuals (see Sections 6.2 and 7).
Actually, simulating with the estimated model can be done along two lines. Either one uses
the estimated measure of intensity with which alternatives (w, h) are offered to an agent,
that is, using the estimates of the q–function, the estimated wage offer distribution, g1,
and the estimated hours distribution, g2, to sample a choice set {(wr, hr) ; r = 1, 2, . . . , R}.
Next, one draws for each of the sampled alternatives, (wr, hr), a random variable from
the Extreme Value Type I distribution21, say  (wr, hr). Next, it is evaluated which of the
drawn alternatives yields highest utility: ln V̂ (f (wr, hr;xf ) , T − hr;xV ) +  (wr, hr). The
alternative (wr, hr) thus yielding the highest utility is considered to be the agent’s optimal
choice according to the model.
Alternatively, one draws from a prior, P1 (w, h;xP1), and looks which alternative has the
highest likelihood to be chosen, that is one looks for the maximum of
V̂ (f (wr, hr;xf ) , T − hr;xV ) q̂ (xq) ĝ1 (wr;xg1) ĝ2 (hr;xg2)
P1(0,0;xP1)
P1(wr,hr;xP1)
over the drawn elements
(wr, hr) for which wr, hr > 0. Denote the alternative yielding the maximum by (wr∗ , hr∗).
The alternative chosen according to this second simulation method coincides with this max-
imum, (wr∗ , hr∗), if
V̂ (f (wr∗ , hr∗ ;xf ) , T − hr∗ ;xV ) q̂ (xq) ĝ1 (wr∗ ;xg1) ĝ2 (hr∗ ;xg2)
P1(0,0;xP1)
P1(wr∗ ,hr∗ ;xP1)
>
V̂ (f (0, 0;xf ) , T ;xV ) .
Else, the non–market alternative is the simulated optimal choice.
The practice in Statistics Norway, by Aaberge and his collaborators, has been to follow a go
between. Wages are drawn from the estimated wage distribution ĝ1 (w;xg1). Hours and the
21 The log of a Fréchet distributed random term is Extreme Value Type I distributed.
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proportion of market versus non–market alternatives are drawn from the same priors as for
the sampling of the choice set for the estimation: the uniform distribution on [Hmin, Hmax[
for the labour time, and the observed participation degree in the sample,
(
1− piobs0
)
, for
the number of market alternatives. Then, the simulated optimal choice, (wr∗∗ , hr∗∗), say, is
determined as follows:
(wr∗∗ , hr∗∗) :=
arg max
(wr,hr)∈{{(0,0)}∪{(wr∗ ,hr∗ )}}
{
A, ln
(
Ψ̂ (wr∗ , hr∗ ;xV ,xf ) q̂ (xq) ĝ2 (hr∗ ;xg2)
)
+  (wr∗ , hr∗)
}
,
where A :=
{
ln
(
Ψ̂ (wr, hr;xV ,xf )
)
+  (wr, hr) ,∀ r : (wr, hr) = (0, 0)
}
, and
(wr∗ , hr∗):= arg max
(wr,hr):wr,hr>0
{
ln
(
Ψ̂ (wr, hr;xV ,xf ) q̂ (xq) ĝ2 (hr)
)
+  (wr, hr) ,∀ r : wr, hr > 0
}
.
(27)
Notice that if one would have formulated the likelihood including the correction terms for
sampling hours from the uniform distribution, and non–market opportunities from the within
sample observed probability of being non–active, the equivalent of the expressions over which
the maximum is taken in the bottom line of equation (27), would be:
ln
(
Ψ̂ (wr, hr;xV ,xf )
̂˜q (xq) ĝ2 (hr;xg2))+ ln (Hmax −Hmin) + ln( piobs01− piobs0
)
+  (wr, hr) .
It can be seen from the definition of q (xq) below equation (26), and the definition of q˜ (xq)
below equation (24), that both expressions are equivalent. Furthermore,
ln
(̂˜
q (xq) ĝ2 (hr;xg2)
)
= η̂′qxq + ln γ̂1 +
K∑
k=1
χ
(
hr ∈
[
Hk,Hk
[)
γ̂k+1,
where χ (condition) is the indicator function, which equals one if the condition serving as
its argument is satisfied, and equals zero otherwise.
Another in between simulation method is continuing to draw hours from the uniform distri-
bution on [Hmin, Hmax[, but using the estimated rate of market to non–market opportunit-
ies, q̂ (xq), to determine the intensity of sampling formal labour market jobs. The criterion
to determine the most preferred job offer from the sampled set, (wr∗ , hr∗), that replaces the
bottom line of equation (27) in this case, becomes:
(wr∗ , hr∗) :=
arg max
(wr,hr):wr,hr>0
{
ln
(
Ψ̂ (wr, hr;xV ,xf ) γ̂1 (Hmax −Hmin) ĝ2 (hr;xg2)
)
+  (wr, hr) , ∀ r : wr, hr > 0
}
,
(28)
irrespective of whether the sampling correction terms has been included in the likelihood or
not.
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In the results presented below in section 6.1 the first method of simulating was used. That
is: market alternatives were drawn from the estimated wage offer and offered labour time
regimes, and the relative number of job offers tot non–market alternatives is determined by
the estimated q-function. A similar approach is followed for constructing the counterfactuals
in the simulation exercise of section 7.
4 Data
The model is estimated on the Belgian database of the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (eu–silc). We use the data that were collected in 2007. The entire
dataset consists of 6348 households or 15493 individuals. It is representative for the Belgian
population of private households. Persons living in collective households or institutions are
excluded from the target population. The survey provides detailed information on earnings
as well as on socio–demographic characteristics of each household.
In order to estimate the model, we relied on three different sub–samples of couples, single
females and single males. Each sub–sample consists exclusively of individuals that are avail-
able for the labour market; i.e. aged between 16 and 64 year and not being sick, in education,
disabled or (pre)retired. Self–employed are excluded due to the lack of reliable information
on hours worked and income earned. Mixed households in which only one of the partners
is available for the labour market are also excluded from the estimation sample. Finally,
we drop households whose children are already available for the labour market but are still
living with their parents. It is reasonable to assume that their labour supply decisions are
different from those of a normal household without working children because it is not clear
whether these households consider their labour supply decision as a collective or as an indi-
vidual process. Given this data selection, we are able to estimate the labour supply model
on 1457 couple households, 571 single females, and 449 single males. In total, they represent
approximately 41% of the total population in Belgium.
euromod is used as microsimulation tool for the calculation of net disposable income for
each element in the opportunity set of households.22 Gross household labour income is equal
to the sum of labour earnings of all household members. The income tax and employee’s
social security contributions are deducted from gross income, and social transfers such as
social assistance, unemployment benefits, child benefits, education benefits and housing be-
nefits are added. We assume full take–up of social assistance if the eligibility criteria are
fulfilled.
Descriptive statistics for the selected sub–samples can be found in Table 1. In the wage
22 Version f5.5 was used. More information about euromod can be found at their website:
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample
Singles Couples
Description Female Male Female Male
Age (years) 41.1 39.9 38.1 40.2
% hh having 0-3 year old children 5.78% 0.45% 18.67% 18.67%
% hh having 4-6 year old children 9.46% 0.89% 17.16% 17.16%
% hh having 7-9 year old children 10.16% 1.78% 18.19% 18.19%
Potential experience (years) 21.3 20.6 18.0 20.4
Education:
Low educated 22.8% 24.5% 16.8% 19.8%
Secondary education 34.6% 41.9% 38.5% 39.0%
High educated 42.6% 33.6% 44.7% 41.2%
Residence:
Brussels 19.8% 21.2% 9.3% 9.3%
Flanders 44.1% 45.2% 58.5% 58.5%
Wallonia 36.1% 33.6% 32.3% 32.3%
Participation rate (%) 68.12 78.84 79.40 93.20
Hours worked/week:
Conditional on working 35.88 39.69 32.50 40.84
Unconditional 24.45 31.29 25.81 38.06
Hourly wage (euro) 14.91 15.20 14.73 16.25
Disposable income (e /month) 1567 1588 3143
Number of observations 571 449 1457
Source: Own Calculations, EU-SILC 2007
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offer equation an indicator for experience is used. Since we do not have information on the
number of years a person has actually been working since she entered the labour market,
potential experience is used. It is defined as the number of years since the person entered the
labour market. That is age minus 15 years for a lowly educated person, age minus 19 years
for a middle educated person, and age minus 23 years for a highly educated person. As this
variable is highly correlated with age, age will not be included as a separate variable in the
wage offer equation.
Besides information from the eu–silc questionnaire, we also used external information on
type specific unemployment. This variable should serve as a proxy for job availability, and
may help to identify the distinction between the contribution of opportunities and preference
factors in the model. Appendix III contains more information on this variable.
5 Estimation results
Table 2 specifies the covariates that have been used in the different parts of the model. In
Table 3 we report estimated parameters for the model. Next, we investigate the impact of
age on preference intensity for leisure (as compared to consumption), and opportunities.
Table 2: Model specification
Preferences Opportunities
x
V
xq xg2 xg1
variable job offers hours wages
Regional dummiesa yes yes no no
Education dummiesb yes yes no yes
Age yes yes no no
Group specific unemployment rate no yes no no
Number of children yes no no no
Gender yes yes yes yes
Potential experience no no no yes
a Bxl=Brussels, Fl=Flanders, Wal=Wallonia.
b Low, Middle, High.
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Table 3: Estimation results: Preferences couples
Procedure to sample choice set: importance samplinga with replacement and
expected number of non–market alternatives equal to piobs0
Log likelihood -8427.3013
Description Estimate Standard Error t–value
1.a) Consumption & leisure interaction M&F
Consumption Couples exponent 0.579 0.054 10.69
Consumption Couples constant 4.763 0.310 15.35
Leisure interaction M&F.in couples 0.128 0.052 2.45
Consumption single M exponent 0.261 0.132 1.98
Consumption single M constant 4.517 0.401 11.25
Consumption single F exponent -0.151 0.166 -0.91
Consumption single F constant 4.239 0.337 12.58
1.b) Leisure coefficients males in couples
Leisure M in couples exponent -9.029 0.707 -12.77
Leisure M in couples constant 11.153 5.533 2.02
Leisure M in couples ln(age) -5.890 3.023 -1.95
Leisure M in couples ln(age)2 0.821 0.418 1.97
Leisure M in couples ch03 -0.003 0.047 -0.06
Leisure M in couples ch36 0.056 0.051 1.10
Leisure M in couples ch69 -0.011 0.047 -0.24
Leisure M in couples dum region Walloonb 0.106 0.055 1.93
Leisure M in couples dum region Brussels 0.131 0.090 1.45
Leisure M in couples dum education LOWc -0.127 0.067 -1.89
Leisure M in couples dum education HIGH -0.070 0.048 -1.47
1.c) Leisure coefficients females in couples
Leisure F in couples exponent -7.673 0.552 -13.90
Leisure F in couples constant -7.855 11.558 -0.68
Leisure F in couples ln(age) 4.599 6.583 0.70
Leisure F in couples ln(age)2 -0.492 0.932 -0.53
Leisure F in couples ch03 0.437 0.162 2.70
Leisure F in couples ch36 0.468 0.171 2.74
Leisure F in couples ch69 0.354 0.172 2.06
Leisure F in couples dum region Walloon 0.243 0.145 1.67
Leisure F in couples dum region Brussels 0.014 0.208 0.07
Leisure F in couples dum education LOW 0.673 0.293 2.29
Leisure F in couples dum education HIGH -0.713 0.162 -4.42
a Importance sampling is explained in Appendix II.
b Flanders region is reference category.
c Middle education level is reference category.
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Table 3: Estimation results ctd.: Preferences singles
Procedure to sample choice set: importance sampling with replacement and
expected number of non–market alternatives equal to piobs0
Description Estimate Standard Error t–value
1.d) Leisure coefficients single males
Leisure single M exponent -6.169 1.172 -5.26
Leisure single M constant -5.752 17.286 -0.33
Leisure single M ln(age) 3.567 9.722 0.37
Leisure single M ln(age)2 -0.403 1.350 -0.30
Leisure single M ch36 -0.474 0.903 -0.52
Leisure single M ch69 -0.906 0.634 -1.43
Leisure single M dum region Walloon 0.835 0.395 2.12
Leisure single M dum region Brussels 0.211 0.303 0.70
Leisure single M dum education LOW -0.356 0.321 -1.11
Leisure single M dum education HIGH -0.507 0.290 -1.75
1.e) Leisure coefficients single females
Leisure single F exponent -9.328 1.259 -7.41
Leisure single F constant 22.335 12.697 1.76
Leisure single F ln(age) -11.839 6.938 -1.71
Leisure single F ln(age)2 1.637 0.959 1.71
Leisure single F ch03 0.769 0.420 1.83
Leisure single F ch36 0.061 0.158 0.39
Leisure single F ch69 -0.054 0.133 -0.41
Leisure single F dum region Walloon 0.121 0.136 0.89
Leisure single F dum region Brussels -0.140 0.122 -1.14
Leisure single F dum education LOW 0.213 0.247 0.86
Leisure single F dum education HIGH -0.569 0.186 -3.05
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Table 3: Estimation results ctd.: Relative intensity of market alternatives and peaks hours
Procedure to sample choice set: importance sampling with replacement and
expected number of non–market alternatives equal to piobs0
Description Estimate Standard Error t–value
2.a) Estimated coefficients opportunities & peaks males
Opportunity M constant -63.435 18.410 -3.45
Opportunity M unemployment rate -0.491 0.420 -1.17
Opportunity M dummy region Walloon -0.645 0.228 -2.83
Opportunity M dummy region Brussels -1.351 0.289 -4.67
Opportunity M dummy LOW education -0.256 0.363 -0.71
Opportunity M dummy HIGH education -0.103 0.274 -0.38
Opportunity M ln(age) 35.200 9.878 3.56
Opportunity M ln(age)2 -5.152 1.330 -3.87
Peaks M <18.5,20.5> interval 0.654 0.228 2.86
Peaks M <29.5,30.5> interval 0.874 0.189 4.61
Peaks M <37.5,40.5> interval 2.694 0.060 45.21
2.b) Estimated coefficients opportunities & peaks females
Opportunity F constant -68.299 13.705 -4.98
Opportunity F unemployment rate -0.568 0.200 -2.83
Opportunity F dummy region Walloon -0.494 0.157 -3.14
Opportunity F dummy region Brussels -0.851 0.219 -3.89
Opportunity F dummy LOW education 0.285 0.256 1.11
Opportunity F dummy HIGH education 0.212 0.209 1.02
Opportunity F ln(age) 38.169 7.460 5.12
Opportunity F ln(age)2 -5.597 1.019 -5.49
Peaks F <18.5,20.5> interval 1.647 0.100 16.45
Peaks F <29.5,30.5> interval 1.797 0.108 16.63
Peaks F <37.5,40.5> interval 2.177 0.070 31.20
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Table 3: Estimation results ctd.: Wage distribution
Procedure to sample choice set: importance sampling with replacement and
expected number of non–market alternatives equal to piobs0
Description Estimate Standard Error t–value
3. Estimated coefficients wage equations
3.a) Wage equation males
Wage M σ 0.266 0.004 59.48
Wage M constant 2.074 0.029 70.87
Wage M potential experience 2.233 0.250 8.92
Wage M potential experience2 -2.844 0.560 -5.08
Wage M low education -0.155 0.019 -8.03
Wage M high education 0.267 0.015 17.45
3.b) Wage equation females
Wage F σ 0.263 0.005 58.44
Wage F constant 2.053 0.027 77.02
Wage F potential experience 2.303 0.242 9.50
Wage F potential experience2 -3.273 0.603 -5.43
Wage F low education -0.107 0.024 -4.54
Wage F high education 0.299 0.016 18.81
5.1 Preferences
The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour time for singles equals:
MRSc,hj =
(
β′h,jxV
) · ((T − hj))αh,j−1 /Tαh,j
βc,j · cαc,j−1j
, j = 1, 2, (29)
and for couples it is equal to:
MRSc,hj =
(
β′hjxV
)
· (T − hj)αhj−1 /Tαhj + βh1,h2
(
((T−hi)/T )αhi−1
αhi
)
((T − hj))αhj−1 /Tαhj
βc,g · cαc,g−1 ,
(30)
i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
Notice that the covariates influencing preferences affect the marginal rate of substitution
only through their influence on
(
β′hjxV
)
. More specifically, as
(
β′hjxV
)
increases in one
of the covariates, the marginal rate of substitution in any point (c, hj) becomes higher for
persons with a larger value on that variable. Hence, a person exhibiting a higher value on
that covariate will have relatively steeper indifference curves. That is, she will exhibit a
more intense preference for leisure.
We illustrate this in Figures 2 and 3 for the case of age. For single males, age has a concave
parabolic impact on
(
β′hjxV
)
with the top situated at 93 years. So, the marginal rate of
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Figure 2: Impact of age on steepness of indifference curves: singles
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substitution between consumption and labour time, and thus intensity of preferences for
leisure, increases with age in the range of the values obtained for age in our data (16–64
years). This is illustrated by the black indifference curves in consumption labour time space
in Figure 2: the dashed curve applies to a single male of 25 years, the steeper full curve to
someone of 36 years old, and the steepest, dotted curve to someone of 58 years old. The
curves become steeper with age.
For single females, the influence of age on
(
β′hjxV
)
is convex parabolic, with the bottom
at the age of 37 years. So, the indifference curves for consumption and labour time become
flatter from the age of 16 until that of 37 years, and their slope starts increasing when
becoming older then 37 years. This is illustrated by the gray curves in Figure 2. The dashed
(age 25 years) and dotted curves (age 58 years) are both steeper than that of a single female
at the age of 36 years. Preference intensity for leisure of single females is lowest at the age
of 37 years.
At first sight it seems that females have more intense preference for leisure than males
(compare the grey and black curves in Figure 2), but note that the indifference curves are
not single crossing, so that a classification of intensity of preferences for leisure with respect
to sex is not easily made.
31
Figure 3: Impact of age on steepness of indifference curves: couples
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For males, respectively females in couples the situation is reversed as compared to the case of
singles (see Figure 3). Female spouses have increasing intensity of preference for leisure with
age until the age of 107 years. For males the least intense preference for leisure is reached
at the age of 36 years.
As far as the significance of these effects is concerned, the precision of the estimates of the
age effect of females in couples and that of single males is poor. Those of single females and
males in couples are reasonable.
As for the impact of education, the intensity of preference for leisure relative to consumption
of females is decreasing with education level, irrespective whether they are single, or live in
a couple. The effect of a lower education level is small though for singles and not really sig-
nificantly different from that of middle education. For males, the situation is again different,
with both higher and lower educated men having less intense preference for leisure relative
to consumption, irrespective whether they are single or live in couples. The precision of the
estimate for lowly educated single men is poor, while the other education coefficients are
moderately well estimated.
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5.2 Opportunities
Figure 4 represents the estimation of the wage offer distributions differentiated by sex and
education level. Notice that this is a wage offer distribution. Simulated and observed wages
are discussed in Section 6.1. The estimates of these distributions are very precise, and robust
to different specifications for other parts of the model.
From Figure 4 it can be seen that higher education shifts the wage offer distribution to
the right, both for males and females. A similar effect is obtained for most of the range of
potential experience. Table 4 reports e.g. the means of the wage offer distribution for 10 and
25 years of potential experience at different education levels, both for males and females. The
mean of the wage offers increases with 1.7 to 2.7 euro over this range. However, as potential
experience surpasses 35 years for females, and 39 years for men, the effect of additional
experience becomes slightly negative. Potentially, the variable takes up an age effect here.
However, age and potential experience were by construction too much correlated to include
them separately in this part of the model.
The differences between males and females are small (dashed lines in Figure 4 apply to
females, the full lines to males) as compared to the impact of the other covariates, and not
always in the disadvantage of females. The latter is the case for persons with a middle
education level.
Table 4: Mean of the wage offer distributions by sex, education and experience
Gross wage (euro per hour)
Male Female
Years of potential experience
Education level 10 year 25 year 10 year 25 year
Low 8.58 10.33 8.83 10.50
Middle 10.02 12.06 9.83 11.69
High 13.08 15.74 13.25 15.76
Figure 5 represents the distributions of offered labour time regimes by sex.23 Again, these
are not actual labour time regimes nor the ones chosen according to the model. The most
salient observation is that this distribution is different for males and for females, the latter
receiving more part time, and less full time job offers.
23 Admittedly, this part of the model is not non–parametrically identified. So, if one would like to explain
this peak pattern by differences in preferences, we cannot tell this to be wrong on pure empirical grounds.
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Figure 4: Estimated wage offer distributions differentiated by sex and education
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Figure 5: Estimated distribution of offered labour time regimes
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Figure 6 and Table 5 report the impact of the covariates xq on the intensity of job offers (the
pi1–function). This variable measures the extent to which vacancies posted on the labour
market are suited for the capacities a person is endowed with. As ruro is a static model,
the total stock of capacities of a person is assumed to be fixed. As such, the estimated pi1
can be interpreted as the percentage of alternatives available to an individual which include
a job offer.
Grey curves in Figure 6 apply to females, black ones to males. The reference category (full
lines) applies to a person living in Flanders region (Fl) with middle education level. Job
offer intensity increases with age until the age of about 30 years, while it (quite drastically)
decreases afterwards, a little more so for females than for males.
Dashed and dotted curves reflect the impact of region when compared to the corresponding
full lines. Job offer intensity is lower in Walloon (Wal, dashed lines), and especially in
Brussels capital region (Bxl, dotted lines).
Figure 6: Intensity of demand for individual capacities on the labour market
in function of age, and differentiated by sex and region
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The sign of the effect of education on pi1 does not depend on the level of type–specific un-
employment rate nor on the age of a person. We report therefore in Table 5 the impact of
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Table 5: Intensity of demand for individual capacities on the labour market
Evaluated at age=30 years, and type specific unemployment rate=6%
Male Female
Region
Education level Bxl Fl Wal Bxl Fl Wal
Low 38.2% 70.5% 55.6% 63.0% 80.0% 70.9%
Middle 44.4% 75.5% 61.8% 56.2% 75.0% 64.7%
High 41.8% 73.5% 59.3% 61.3% 78.8% 69.4%
education at fixed values for age (30 years) and type specific unemployment rates (6%). Sur-
prisingly, for males high education lowers job offer intensity, while for females low education
raises job offer intensity. However, the effects are small, certainly in the light of the rather
large standard errors of the estimated coefficients for these variables.
6 Fit and behavioural response
6.1 Fit
We now evaluate the fit of the estimates reported in Table 3 using the first simulation method
discussed in Section 3.4. We first report results for couples (Figures 7–9), and then for singles
(Figures 10–12).
We compare the marginal distributions of ‘observed’ and simulated disposable income, which
equals the value for consumption, c, in the model24 (Figures 7 and 10), observed and sim-
ulated wages of males and females (Figures 8 and 11), and observed and simulated hours
of work (Figures 9 and 12). The curves labelled by observed refer to observed values,
while estimated refers to simulated values by the estimated model. Observed and simu-
lated consumption and wages are compared by means of Gaussian kernel densities of both
distributions. For wages, the distributions are conditional on being positive (labour market
participants only). For the labour time regimes we construct a histogram with bins coin-
ciding with the peaks and troughs of the offered labour time regimes distributions. In this
way, one can get a first assessment of the extent to which differences in offered labour time
regimes are reflected in actual choices. We come back to this distinction between offered
alternatives and actual choices while discussing Figure 12.
Of course, even if the observed and simulated values would perfectly coincide, there might still
occur large differences between simulated and observed values for each individual separately.
24 Disposable income is actually not an observed value, but calculated from gross income by euromod.
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The transition matrices between observed and simulated labour time regimes are reported
in Appendix IV.
1. Couples.
The mean estimated consumption within couples is 3083 e per month. Compare that
with the observed mean of 3143 e per month reported in Table 1. The simulated distri-
bution (black curve in Figure 7) slightly overestimates the number of households with
lower incomes, at the expense of those with modal disposable incomes (compare the
simulated values, represented by the black curve, with the observed values represented
by the dashed grey one).
Figure 7: Densities simulated and observed disposable income for couples
Curves labelled by estimated refer to the simulation obtained from the estimated model, while observed
refers to observed values.
The simulated (conditional) distribution of female wages (black curve on the rhs panel
of Figure 8) is fatter at moderately low and moderately high wages, and less densely
populated at modal incomes, as compared to the observed one (grey dashed curve on
the rhs panel of Figure 8). Similarly, the simulated wage distribution of the males
(black line on the lhs panel of Figure 8) is more populated at lower wages than the
observed one (dashed grey line on the lhs panel of Figure 8), at the expense of a
smaller occurrence of modal wages.
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Figure 8: Densities simulated and observed wages males (left) and females (right) in couples
The number of non–participants in the labour market is overestimated. Compare
thereto the filled grey (observed) and unfilled black bordered (simulated) left most
spikes in both panels of Figure 9. Still, the number of cases in which none of both
partners work, is underestimated (2.6% simulated as compared to 3.9% in the sample).
The estimated peaks are in general somewhat underestimated, except for the number
of females accepting a full time job, which is overestimated. More than full time jobs by
males, and jobs between three quarter and full time are underestimated. For females
the occurrence of jobs less than half time is overestimated.
Figure 9: Histograms labour time males (left) and females (right) in couples
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2. Singles.
Figures 10–12 represent the fit of the model for singles. The occurrence of moderately
low consumption levels of single females is underestimated, while that of modal in-
comes is overestimated (rhs of Figure 10). Mean estimated consumption of females
is 1575 e per month, to be compared with the observed value of 1567 e per month
observed (see Table 1). For males these figures are respectively 1571 e per month
fitted versus 1588 e per month observed. The empirical distribution is somewhat less
skewed to the right than the fitted one. That is to a lesser extent also the case for the
single females.
Figure 10: Densities disposable income single males (left) and single females (right)
Figure 11: Densities wages single males (left) and females (right)
The wage distribution of single females (rhs of Figure 11) is better fitted than that of males
(lhs of Figure 11). The simulated distribution for females is somewhat more skewed to the
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Figure 12: Histograms labour time regimes single males (left) and single females (right)
right than the observed one. The simulated distribution of males has slightly fatter tails
than the observed one.
Labour market participation of single males (lhs of Figure 12) is overestimated, while that
of single females is somewhat underestimated (rhs of Figure 12). The observed occurrence
of half, three quarter and full time jobs for males is well fitted. Occurrence of half time and
full time jobs among single females is underestimated, that of three quarter jobs slightly
overestimated.
Finally, the simulated and observed distribution of labour time regimes for single males (lhs
of Figure 12) illustrate that these should be distinguished from the availability of job offers
specifying certain labour time regimes, as was mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Estimates of the relative availability of half time and three quarter time jobs as compared to
jobs between three quarter time and full time were represented by the corresponding peaks
and through in Figure 5. So, despite our estimates reveal that half time and three quarter
time jobs are more intensely offered than jobs between three quarter time and full time,
single males do not choose, neither according to the data, nor according to the simulated
behaviour, the former type of jobs more often than the latter.
6.2 Elasticities
Table 6 reports the total reaction in terms of labour supply and the effect on participation
to the labour market (extensive margin), following a shift of the density of the males’,
respectively females’, wage offer distribution to the right by 10% (augmenting the estimated
location parameter with ln 1.1). Additionally, we report intensive margins (effect on labour
supply conditional on participating in the base line, inclusive of the labour market leavers).
The variable ‘part in’ gives the percentage of entrants into the labour market, while ‘part
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out’ represents the percentage of leavers.
Table 6: Aggregate wage elasticities of labour supply
Shift of female wage distribution Shift of male wage distribution
Couple Single Couple Single
Female Male Female Female Male Male
Total elasticity 0.5034 −0.1054 0.4786 −0.2200 0.3104 0.2858
Intensive margin 0.1660 −0.1342 0.0363 −0.2559 0.1331 0.0280
Part in 2.883% 0.275% 2.977% 0.412% 1.647% 2.004%
Part out 0.000% 1.098% 0.000% 1.510% 0.000% 0.000%
Compared to Marshallian elasticities in the literature estimated by static models using micro
data, the total elasticity estimates produced here are rather large (Compare e.g. with the
figures reported in Tables 6 and 7 of Keane, 2011). However, as far as these total elasticities
include the extensive margin, and are calculated as the proportional change in total labour
time for the whole sub–sample, these need to be compared with macro elasticities, which
are usually much larger, even as compared to the figures obtained here.25 Still, it should be
stressed that the figures reported here are conceptually of a different nature, in that actually
obtained wages in the present model are the result of choosing the most attractive job offer
according to the persons’ preferences. Therefore, a reaction to an exogenous change in that
wage cannot be conceived of in the framework we used. What was, alternatively, done, is to
shift the entire distribution of the wages included in the job offers, to the right. This cannot
be considered the same as a change in an exogenously given wage. As the ruro–model
incorporates frictions due to restrictions in the labour market opportunities an agent faces,
this might account for the lower values of the elasticities reported here, compared to values
obtained for macro figures.
7 Age profiles of labour market participation: the con-
tribution of preferences versus opportunities
In the present section we want to explore to what extent the lower participation figures of
and the decrease in the number of hours worked by older persons in the dataset (cf. the
introduction) can, according to the model, be ascribed to an increasing intensity of preference
25 On the controversy about micro versus macro estimates, see amongst others Chetty et al. (2011),
Chetty (2012), Fiorito and Zanella (2012), Keane and Rogerson (2012), Jäntti et al. (2015), and the references
therein.
42
for leisure, or rather to the lower intensity of job offers suitable to the capacities of older
people.
Thereto we performed two counterfactual simulation exercises, and compare them with the
baseline simulation. In the first, henceforth labelled as ‘EO’, we have changed the intensity
of job offers pi1 . Every individual in the sample got the maximal value for pi1 in function
of age. Figure 6 showed that this corresponds to the age of 30. Hence, in this ‘equality of
opportunity’ simulation we calculate labour market choices as if all individuals would get
the same number of suitable job offers as someone of age 30. In the second simulation, we
leave opportunities unaffected, but modify preferences (labelled ‘EP’). Every individual now
is endowed preferences exhibiting the lowest intensity of preferences for leisure according to
age, that is yielding the flattest indifference curves. For single females this is 37 years, and
for males in couples 36 years. For single males and females in couples, the indifference curve
is uniformly steepening with age in the relevant age range of the sample. In these cases we
used 21 years as the ‘lowest’ age.
Table 7 contains the results of these simulations. For both counterfactuals we calculated the
mean participation rate (denoted by ‘part’ in the table) and mean labour supply (denoted
‘hours’ in the table) by age category. For hours we both calculated the unconditional mean,
and the average hours conditional on participating. It seems as if ‘equalising’ differences in
opportunities with respect to age, has in the first place an impact on the extensive margin,
and much less so on the intensive margin of the number of hours worked. Overall, that is, the
fours subgroups combined, the participation rate goes up with 6.9 percentage points (from
82.0% to 88.9%) in the ‘EO’–counterfactual. This effect is substantial for all subgroups,
ranging from +3.1 percentage points (ppt) for males in couples, to +8.9 ppt for females
in couples, and +6.7 and even +11.6 ppt for respectively single males and females. The
breakdown of this effect according to age groups reveals that the rise in participation rates
increases with age for singles, while for persons in couples it mirrors the concave shape of pi1
with respect to age. Equalising opportunities has no perceptible effect on the average number
of hours worked, once we condition on participation. For the whole sample the effect is even
slightly negative (the average number of hours decreases from 36.4 to 36.0. This is the result
of a small decrease for all subgroups, save for males in couples where we find a small increase
(from 39.8 to 39.9 hours worked per week). The second counterfactual shows that a decrease
in the intensity of preferences for leisure both has an impact on the participation rate and
on the number of hours worked. The overall participation rate increases with 2.6 ppt from
82.0% in the baseline to 84.6% under this ‘equalising preferences’ scenario. This is a much
smaller increase than under the ‘EO’–scenario which yielded an increase of 6.9 ppt. Also in
contrast with the previous ‘EO’–counterfactual, we do find an effect on the intensive margin
now. On average, the number of hours conditional on participation increases with 1.9 (from
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Table 7: Participation and avg. labour time by age class in baseline and counterfactuals
Age 15<age<=30 30<age<=40 40<age<=50 50<age<=64 all
Category Couples: males
n obs. 250 537 416 254 1457
participation
part base 93.2% 94.2% 94.5% 81.9% 92.0%
part EO 94.4% 94.4% 97.1% 94.1% 95.1%
part EP 94.0% 94.6% 94.5% 81.1% 92.1%
average hours of labour time per week – unconditional
hours base 35.1 38.0 38.2 32.6 36.6
hours EO 35.4 38.1 39.8 36.8 37.9
hours EP 36.3 38.8 39.1 33.6 37.6
average hours of labour time per week – conditional on part.
hours base 37.7 40.3 40.5 39.8 39.8
hours EO 37.6 40.4 41.0 39.2 39.9
hours EP 38.6 41.0 41.4 41.4 40.8
Category Couples: females
n obs. 365 524 402 166 1457
participation
part base 82.5% 85.1% 77.6% 49.4% 78.3%
part EO 86.0% 86.8% 88.8% 86.7% 87.2%
part EP 84.1% 88.5% 84.8% 63.9% 83.6%
average hours of labour time per week – unconditional
hours base 27.6 26.0 25.0 16.1 25.0
hours EO 28.2 26.4 28.3 26.3 27.4
hours EP 30.1 30.2 31.6 23.5 29.8
average hours of labour time per week – conditional on part.
hours base 33.4 30.5 32.2 32.5 31.9
hours EO 32.8 30.4 31.9 30.4 31.4
hours EP 35.7 34.1 37.2 36.8 35.6
36.4 to 38.3), compared to the small decrease in the ‘EO’–scenario. This effect is largest for
females in couples (+3.7 hours). For males and females in couples and for single males the
effect on hours is more uniform across age classes than in the ‘EO’–counterfactual.
In the Figures 13–15, we report comparisons of utility obtained in the baseline with utility
in the ‘equalised opportunity’ counterfactual. We do not reproduce a similar picture for
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Table 7: Participation and avg. labour time by age class in baseline and counterfactuals ctd.
Age 15<age<=30 30<age<=40 40<age<=50 50<age<=64 all
Category Singles: males
n obs. 106 135 119 89 449
participation
part base 77.4% 91.1% 84.9% 65.2% 81.1%
part EO 78.3% 92.6% 90.8% 87.6% 87.8%
part EP 79.2% 92.6% 87.4% 71.9% 84.0%
average hours of labour time per week – unconditional
hours base 29.5 35.3 33.1 24.7 31.3
hours EO 30.3 35.7 35.3 32.8 33.7
hours EP 30.6 37.3 35.2 28.8 33.5
average hours of labour time per week – conditional on part.
hours base 38.1 38.7 39.0 37.9 38.6
hours EO 38.7 38.5 38.9 37.4 38.4
hours EP 38.7 40.3 40.2 40.1 39.9
Category Singles: females
n obs. 102 180 171 118 571
participation
part base 63.7% 70.0% 73.1% 55.9% 66.9%
part EO 66.7% 73.3% 82.5% 90.7% 78.5%
part EP 66.7% 70.6% 74.3% 59.3% 68.7%
average hours of labour time per week – unconditional
hours base 22.4 26.7 25.0 18.5 23.7
hours EO 23.6 27.9 28.4 30.0 27.7
hours EP 23.8 26.9 25.6 22.5 25.1
average hours of labour time per week – conditional on part.
hours base 35.1 38.1 34.2 33.2 35.5
hours EO 35.3 38.0 34.4 33.0 35.3
hours EP 35.7 38.2 34.4 38.0 36.5
the ‘EP’–counterfactual, since preferences have been changed thereto. Consequently, utility
comparisons between baseline results and counterfactual for the same individual have no
clear meaning. This difficulty does not arise in ‘equalised opportunity’ case. One of our next
steps will be to calculate welfare indices apt to a case in which preferences have been changed,
and which we think can be more meaningfully compared. The black line in the figure is the
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Figure 13: Utility couples: baseline and counterfactual
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45◦–line and reflects utility in the baseline. The dots are the utility levels obtained by the
optimal choice in the ‘EO’–counterfactual, i.e. when job offer intensity would have reached
the same value as when a person was thirty years old. Dots above the black line imply a gain
in utility, dots below the black line, a loss. Since for all individuals, the job offer intensity
in the counterfactual is at least as large as in the baseline, and for most individuals it is
larger, one would at first sight expect that no one would be worse off in the counterfactual
compared to the baseline. Yet, for all three sub–samples, we do find some cases in which the
final choice is less preferred when confronted with an environment in which the opportunity
set has been changed in the direction of more job offers. Hence, a bit surprisingly maybe,
increasing the intensity of job offers does not imply a Pareto improvement. The explanation
for having dots below the black line, is that increasing the job opportunities for persons
with a low preference for jobs (elderly), might be harmful to these people. Indeed, since in
this model, the job offer intensity is expressed as a relative number of market versus non–
market opportunities, a higher job offer intensity, is tantamount to loosing some non–market
opportunities. The latter might have been especially valuable for those with relatively more
intense preference for leisure. It might be considered an unattractive property of the model
that increasing the intensity of job offers is, by definition, mirrored by lowering the degree of
availability of non–market opportunities. Indeed, why would I loose the opportunities to do
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what I liked most, when more jobs were offered to me? The worst that could happen is that
none of these additional opportunities is more attractive than what I am currently doing,
keeping the level of utility constant. Still, in this static model, the total stock of capacities
an individual is endowed with, is considered as fixed. Increasing job offer intensity then
means that capacities which were originally only apt for performing non–market activities,
now become valuable on the market. In such a case, increasing job offer intensity is not a
bless for all.
Figure 14: Utility single females: baseline and counterfactual
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Figure 15: Utility single males: baseline and counterfactual
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8 Conclusion
This paper has tried to shed some light on the lower labour market participation of the
elderly by exploiting a rich structural model of labour supply, the so–called ruro–model.
Contrary to standard random utility models of labour supply, this model adds substantially
more heterogeneity in individual opportunities by integrating an individual specific job offer
intensity as an explanatory variable for observed behaviour. We have estimated this model
on Belgian eu–silc data of 2007, which allowed us to quantify to what extent lower labour
market participation is due to changing preferences (executing a job might become less
enjoyable with age) or differences in opportunities (elderly getting less, or less attractive job
offers).
The estimates indicate that the relation between job offer intensity and age has an inverted
U–shape with top at about 30 years. Job offer intensity after that age decreases sharply, so
that the avaialbility of suitable jobs after the age of 50 is lower than that for youngsters.
This effect is a bit more outspoken for females than for males. We also found important
regional variation in the job offer intensity, being lower in Wallonia, and especially in the
Brussels capital region, as compared to Flanders. As for the distribution of wage offers, we
found, unsurprisingly, that, on average, higher wages were offered to persons with higher
education level. The differences between males and females, however, were small.
The effect of age on preferences was less clear–cut than the effect on opportunities. We
found two cases where the intensity of preference for leisure, or the distaste for paid work,
monotonically increases with age in the relevant age range (i.e. 16 to 64 years for our data):
for females in couples, and for single males. For both these groups, indifference curves in
the labour time versus consumption space, become steeper with age. For the other two
subgroups, i.e. single females and males in couples, the pattern is non–monotonic. For
single females and males in couples, preference intensity for leisure is lowest at the age of
respectively 37 and 36 years. Their indifference curves become flatter from the age of 16
until that of 37 (respectively 36) years, and their slope starts increasing when becoming older
than 37 (respectively 36) years.
To get an idea of the relative importance of both forms of heterogeneity (impact of age via
preferences and opportunities), we conducted a simulation of two counterfactuals. First, we
removed part of heterogeneity in opportunities by giving all individuals the maximal job
offer intensity in terms of age (that of a 30 years old person). Second, we removed part of
the heterogeneity in preferences by endowing all individuals with preferences at the subgroup
specific age at which the intensity of preference for leisure was at its minimum. Our tentative
conclusion from a comparison of labour market behaviour in these two counterfactuals with
the baseline situation is that opportunities which decline with age are at least as an important
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factor in explaining low participation rates for the elderly, as is the fact that preference change
with growing older. More specifically, the effect of opportunities seems to work primarily
through the extensive margin, whereas the effect of preferences is more outspoken in the
intensive than in the extensive margin. From a policy point of view this might be relevant.
We feel that the rich specification of the ruro–model is promising. Therefore, we think we
should try to estimate with data which allow for a better identification of the important
pi1–function. This might e.g. be obtained by re–estimating the model with more exogenous
variation in job availability, either by e.g. using cross-country variation or variation through
time. Needless to say that the corresponding work to produce choice sets for the estimation in
this framework might be labour intensive (one needs a cross–country microsimulation model
and/or a microsimulation model which can model the gross–net trajectory for several years).
Secondly, structural models like the one presented in this paper are obvious candidates as
suppliers of essential information for normative analyses, based on — in this case, revealed —
preferences. After careful scrutiny of how sensitive estimated preferences are to the inclusion
and specific specification of additional constraints from the demand side of the labour market,
we plan to construct welfare measures in line with our first attempt in Decoster and Haan
(2015). This is especially important when trying to make welfare comparisons between
countries or at different moments in time, when the respective populations to be compared
do not necessarily have the same preferences.
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Appendices
Appendix I Poisson processes
Originally, a Poisson process is a stochastic process describing the probability of the number of
occurrences of a particular event during a certain time spell. More specifically, a Poisson process
assumes that distribution of the time between each pair of consecutive events is independent from
the moment at which the first of these two events occurred, or from any other event in the past, and
that these inter–arrival times are exponentially distribution with parameter λ. This parameter λ
measures the intensity with which such events occur. Under these assumptions, the probability
that a certain event occurs n times within a given unit of time, where n ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . .}, equals:
P (N (t+ 1)−N (t) = n) = λ
n exp [−λ]
n!
, (a.1)
where N (t) is the number of events that occurred in total after t units of time. A Poisson process
is inhomogeneous if the intensity parameter depends on the moment of measurement, λ (t) say. In
that case, the probability that n events occur within a time interval [t, t+ τ ], equals:
P (N (t+ τ)−N (t) = n) = (Λ (τ))
n exp [−Λ (τ)]
n!
, (a.2)
where Λ (τ) :=
∫ t+τ
t λ (s) d s, which is, because of the time independence property of Poisson
processes, independent of t.
A Poisson process can also be spatial. Let an event be described as a point in an m–dimensional
space. A spatial Poisson process determines the probability that n events occur within a subset
of the m–dimensional space. Let, for example, B ⊂ Rm, and let N (B) be the number of events
occurring in B. If the occurrence of such events obeys a Poisson process, then the probability that
there occur n events in B, equals:
P (N (B) = n) = λ
n exp [−λ]
n!
. (a.3)
Again, such a process is said to be inhomogeneous if the intensity of occurrence depends on the points
x ∈ Rm. To describe that process, assume that there exists a measure ρ defined on (measurable)
subsets of the space Rm, and that ρ (B) = 1. The probability that there occur n events in the
subset B, is then:
P (N (B) = n) = (Λ (B))
n exp [−Λ (B)]
n!
, . (a.4)
where Λ (B) := ∫x∈B λ (x) d ρ (x).
Job offers and the availability of non–market activities each are described by an inhomogeneous
spatial Poison process in ruro models. These processes are independent. However, given that the
ruro model is static, the stock of capacities an individual is endowed with, is assumed to be fixed.
If demand for these capacities (by means of job offers) intensifies, a relatively smaller amount of
these capacities serves exclusively for executing non–market activities.
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Appendix II Sampling choice sets
The McFadden approach.
The method of sampling choice sets for estimating discrete choice models was originally developed
by McFadden (1978, section 7) in order to handle cases where the number of choices is so large that
the true likelihood function would become intractable. A summary of this procedure can be found
in Train (2009, pp. 64–66).
Assume that the true choice set, C, consists of a very large, but still discrete, number of alternatives,
indexed by j, k ∈ C := {1, 2, . . . , C}, where C is a natural number. Assume also that the choice
behaviour can be reflected by a multinomial logit model. The systematic part of the utility of an
alternative j ∈ C is denoted by Vj . That is, Vj is a shorthand for a function of a set of covariates
whose values change across alternatives, say xj , and a set of parameters to be estimated, β say.
Total utility derived from j ∈ C is:
Uj := Vj + j , (a.5)
where j is a to the researcher unobserved factor determining that person’s preferences. Assuming
that this term is drawn from an Extreme Value Type I distribution, which has distribution func-
tion exp [− exp (−j)], the probability that this person will opt for alternative j from the set of
available alternatives C, Pj,C say, is equal to:
Pj,C =
exp (Vj)∑
k∈C exp (Vk)
. (a.6)
For some reason, it might be impossible to collect information on all the alternatives in C that are
available to a particular individual (e.g. because this set is too large). Therefore the researcher
might sample a set of alternatives D from C. The observed alternative is included in D, since it
is observed, and thus, by definition, must have been one of the possible alternatives from which
the person has chosen. One might for example partition the set C into M subsets (with M a
natural number such that M < C). Each member of the partition is denoted by Km (m ∈ M :=
{1, 2, . . . ,M}). One can then sample the chosen alternative j with certainty from the subset that
contains the chosen alternative, Km : j ∈ Km, and sample at random an alternative from the
remaining subsets, Km : j /∈ Km.
Sampling a choice set induces a probability to select a subset D from the true choice set C, given
that the person is observed to have selected j. This probability will be denoted by pi (D |j, C ). For
example, when using the sampling procedure discussed in the previous paragraph, and letting Km
be the number of elements in the subset Km of the partition (for each m ∈ M), then pi (D |j, C ) =(
Kn/
∏M
m=1Km
)
, where n is the index of the subset to which the chosen alternative j belongs,
n := m ∈M : j ∈ Km.
By sampling a choice set D, the researcher can only retrieve some information on factors leading
a person to choose alternative j from D rather than from C, while she is actually interested in the
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latter. Denote the probability to choose j from D by Pj,D. Train (2009) shows that:
Pj,D =
exp (Vj)pi (D |j, C )∑
k∈D exp (Vk)pi (D |k, C )
. (a.7)
The essence of the proof lays in the observation that the probability to sample a set D from
C, and observing an agent to choose j, say θC (D, j), is equal to pi (D |j, C ) · Pj,C . Similarly, by
reversing the conditioning, this probability to sample a set D from C, and observing an agent to
choose j, θC (D, j), is also equal to Pj,D ·Π (D), where Π (D) is the unconditional probability to select
a subset D from C according to the sampling procedure, that is Π (D) := ∑k∈C pi (D |k, C ) · Pk,C =∑
k∈D pi (D |k, C ) · Pk,C . The equality follows from observing that the conditional probability to
select a set D, given the observed choice is k, while k does not belong to the sampled set D, is
zero, by definition of the allowed sampling procedures: pi (D |k, C ) = 0 if k /∈ D. Equating both
expressions for θC (D, j) and solving for Pj,D gives equation (a.7).
McFadden (1978) has shown that the parameters β of the utility function, Vj := v (β;xj), can
be estimated consistently by maximising the sampled log–likelihood function L (β;X) based on
the corrected probabilities (a.7), where X is a data set containing for each observation t values of
choice k’s attributes, xt,k say, for all k ∈ C. Let j (t) denote observation t′s observed choice from
the set C. Then, this sampled log–likelihood function becomes:
L (β;X) := −
∑
t
ln
 ∑
k∈Dt
[
exp
[
v (β;xt,k)− v
(
β;xt,j(t)
)] pi (Dt |k, C )
pi (Dt |j (t) , C )
] , (a.8)
McFadden’s result relies upon imposing the positive conditioning property upon the choice set
sampling probabilities pi (D |k, C ), which reads as:
for all j, k ∈ D : if pi (D |j, C ) > 0 then pi (D |k, C ) > 0. (a.9)
A stronger condition which is also sufficient for consistency (and which implies a further simplific-
ation for the sampled likelihood function) is the uniform conditioning property :
∀ j, k ∈ D : pi (D |j, C ) = pi (D |k, C ) . (a.10)
In that case the correction factor in the sampled log–likelihood function (a.8), pi (Dt |k, C ) /pi (Dt |j (t) , C ),
drops out. One could wonder why then the uniform conditioning property has not been unanimously
followed, for reasons of simplicity. Note however that this would result in sampling alternatives that
for some, or all, agents are relatively unlikely to be chosen. Sampling such alternatives would yield
poor information on the factors explaining a person’s actual choice. This method is therefore gener-
ally less efficient (yielding larger standard errors for the estimates of β) than sampling alternatives
on the basis of some prior knowledge or evidence on the alternatives having been chosen, or likely
to be chosen. This is the idea behind importance sampling, which will be discussed later.
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The Aaberge–Colombino–Wennemo approach.
Aaberge, Colombino and Wennemo (2009) propose a similar sampling procedure for estimating
the ruro model. In abstracto, the individual contributions to the likelihood function of the
ruro model equal (compare with equation (18) of the main text):
Qj,C;f =
exp (Vj) f (j)∫
k∈C exp (Vk) f (k) d ρ (k)
, (a.11)
where f (k) is a measure for the intensity with which alternative k is rendered available to the
individual decision maker, and j is the chosen alternative. The set of alternatives C might be
continuous, and ρ (·) is a measure defined over the space of alternatives. So, f is a shorthand for a
function of a set of explanatory variables whose value may be varying across alternatives, say xf,j
(j ∈ C), and a set of parameters to be estimated, δ. In practice, it might be impossible to observe
or use the whole set of alternatives C in the estimation, and a sample D is drawn. Assume the
probability to sample an alternative k from C to be equal to φ (k). Then, the correction proposed
by Aaberge, Colombino, and Wennemo (2009, see equation (9), p.593) is equal to:
Q̂j,D;f,φ =
exp (Vj) f (j) /φ (j)∑
k∈D exp (Vk) f (k) /φ (k)
. (a.12)
The intuitive rationale is that estimates of exp (Vk) f (k) will be affected by the sampling procedure.
More specifically, the term referring to an alternative k in a person’s simulated contribution to the
likelihood function, that would be sampled relatively more often than the intensity with which it
is really rendered available to that person, will get too big a weight. Therefore, its true value,
exp (Vk) f (k), will be underestimated. Dividing true by its sampling weight, φ (k), would correct
for that.
Relating both approaches.
The connection between both approaches seems rather vague at first sight. The formal connec-
tion between both, the McFadden (1978) approach and the Aaberge–Colombino–Wennemo (2009)
approach, is explained in Ben–Akiva and Lerman (1985).
Recall that the probability to choose an alternative j from the sampled choice set D, Pj,D, can be
written as:
Pj,D =
θC (D, j)
Π (D) . (a.13)
Now, in the model of Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999), θC (D, j) is equal to pi (D |j, C )Qj,C;f
(see equation a.11). The unconditional probability to select a subset D from C according to the
sampling procedure, Π (D), equals ∑k∈C pi (D |k, C ) · Qk,C;f = ∑k∈D pi (D |k, C ) · Qk,C;f . Using
equation (a.11), this results in:
Pj,D =
θC (D, j)
Π (D) =
exp (Vj) f (j)pi (D |j, C )∑
k∈D exp (Vk) f (k)pi (D |k, C )
. (a.14)
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One class of sampling choice sets is importance sampling. Each alternative j from the choice set C
gets a (prior) probability weight φ (j) to be sampled from C. So, the probability to sample the
set D from the set of all alternatives C, Π (D), is equal to ∏
j∈D
φ (j)
∏
j /∈D
(1− φ (j)).26 One always
includes the chosen alternative according to the data, as an element in the sampled choice set.
This implies that the probability to sample D, given the chosen alternative is k, denoted earlier
as pi (D |k, C ), equals ∏
j∈D
φ (j)
∏
j /∈D
(1− φ (j)) /φ (k) = ∏
j∈D:
j 6=k
φ (j)
∏
j /∈D
(1− φ (j)) = Π (D) /φ (k).
So, equation (a.14) reduces to:
Pj,D =
exp (Vj) f (j) Π (D) /φ (j)∑
k∈D exp (Vk) f (k) Π (D) /φ (k)
=
exp (Vj) f (j) /φ (j)∑
k∈D exp (Vk) f (k) /φ (k)
, (a.15)
which is exactly equation (a.12) we were looking for.
Importance sampling for the ruro model.
There are several methods of importance sampling. Ben–Akiva and Lerman (1985, 265–267) men-
tion for example three variants. They all however result in the same expression for the corrected
likelihood (a.12).
In the ruro model the set of possible alternatives consists of the union of, on the one hand, the
so–called non–market alternatives (that is possible sets of activities when not accepting any possible
job offer), and, on the other hand, the set of possible packages of a wage, w, and a number of hours
(per week) to be worked, say h, both as specified in a particular job offer. A specific wage–labour
time regime is thus denoted by (w, h). As far as it concerns a job offer, it is assumed that with
w > 0 and Hmax > h ≥ Hmin, with Hmin > 0. Then, non–market alternatives are denoted as wage–
labour time regime packages (w, h), such that (w, h) ≡ (0, 0). So, we have a mixed distribution of
the discrete variable (0, 0) that indicates the option not to accept any job offer, and the continuous
variable (w, h) ∈ R++ × [Hmin, Hmax [.27
Furthermore, in the ruro model, the probability (density) f (k) specified in the previous section,
is a measure for the intensity with which an alternative k characterised by a wage–labour time
bundle (wk, hk), is rendered available to the agent. In the sequel, the log normal density with
location parameter µ1, and scale parameter σ of a random variable z, is abbreviated by n (z;µ1, σ).28
That is n (z;µ1, σ) := 1zσ√2pi exp
(
− (ln z−µ1)2
2σ2
)
if z > 0, and it equals zero otherwise. Then, the
26 See Ben–Akiva and Lerman (1985, p.265) on independent importance sampling.
27 But the realisation of the stochastic process that describes the intensity with which suitable job offers
are rendered available to an individual, results in a discrete set of job offers, each specifying combination of
a wage offer and a labour time regime, (w, h) ∈ R++ × [Hmin, Hmax [.
28 That is the concrete specification we assumed for the wage offer distribution function g1, as notified in
Section 3.2.
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probability (density) f (k) will be further specified as:
f (k) =

pi0
(
ηq;xq
)
if (wk, hk) = (0, 0) ,(
1− pi0
(
ηq;xq
))
n
(
wk; δ
′
g1xg1 , σ
)
γ1 exp (γk)
if (wk, hk) ∈ R++ × [Hk−1,Hk−1 [, for k = 2, . . . ,K + 1,(
1− pi0
(
ηq;xq
))
n
(
wk; δ
′
g1xg1 , σ
)
γ1 if (wk, hk) ∈ R++ × ∪
k=1,...,K+1
[Hk−1, Hk [,
0 else,
(a.16)
whereH0 := Hmin < H1 <H1 < . . . < Hk <Hk < . . . < HK <HK < HK+1 := Hmax, define
the bins of a piecewise uniform distribution for labour time regimes.29The intensity with which
suitable job offers are rendered available to an individual with characteristics xq, is specified by(
1− pi0
(
ηq;xq
))
:=
(
1 + exp
(−η′qxq))−1.30 The parameters (δq, δg1 , σ, γ1, γ2, . . . , γK+1) form to-
gether the parameter vector δ determining the intensity with which alternatives are rendered avail-
able to individuals with characteristics (xq,xg1), as discussed earlier, and which has to be estimated
jointly with the preference parameters β.31 Where necessary, the dependency of f (k) on δ will
explicitly referred to in the notation as follows: p (δ;xq,xg1 , wk, hk) := f (k).
The suitable job offers rendered available to an individual are however not observed. But, the
econometrician can revert to the method of sampling a choice set, and constructing a sampled
likelihood, in order to try to estimate the relevant parameters of the model, β and δ. The alternatives
to be sampled are wage labour time regime combinations.
The sampling methods described here make a fixed number of draws ns form the set {(0, 0)}∪R++×
[Hmin, Hmax [. With an a priori fixed probability, say piobs0 , a draw picks a non–market alternative
(that is (w, h) = (0, 0)). Else, a wage–labour time regime is fixed by independently sampling the
wage from a log normal distribution with a priori determined location and scale parameters, µ
and ς, and the labour time regime from a uniform distribution on the interval [Hmin, Hmax [. The
probability (density, in case (w, h) > 0) to draw a wage–labour time bundle (w, h), denoted by
P (w, h), is thus32:
P (w, h) =

piobs0 if (w, h) = (0, 0) ,(
1− piobs0
) · n (w;µ, ς) · 1
Hmin−Hmax
if (w, h) ∈ R++ × [Hmin, Hmax [,
0 else.
(a.17)
Four options are considered: either one implements the probability of drawing the non–market
alternatives by fixing the number of times the non–market alternative is to be drawn, say n0, as being
equal to the integer nearest to piobs0 · (ns + 1). Or, one treats the number of times the non–market
alternative is drawn, to be a random number, say K0, with expected value E {K0} = piobs0 · (ns + 1),
by letting the probability of each draw to be the non–market alternative to be equal to piobs0 .
29 See Section 3.2. An illustration of the shape of that distribution function is given in Figure 1.
30 See Section 3.2.
31 The vector of covariates determining the value of the density f (k) referred to earlier, and denoted
as xf,k, thus consists in this case of (xq,xw, wk, hk).
32 See equation (25).
61
Secondly, one can sample with or without replacement. Lemp and Kockelman (2012) argue that
sampling with replacement is inefficient since the same alternative may appear several times in the
sampled choice set while not yielding additional information on choice behaviour. But on the other
hand they warn that figuring out the selection probabilities of the sampled choice set D, denoted
earlier as Π (D), might be cumbersome (with larger datasets) if the sampling takes place without
replacement.
One way to implement sampling without replacement, is selecting ns alternatives according to the a
priori determined probability (density) P (w, h) (see equation a.17), and then remove the repeated
draws from the sampled set. If one samples without replacement, the size of the sampled choice is
a random number, while it is fixed when drawing takes place with replacement.
Finally, to reassure that the actually chosen alternative belongs to the sampled choice set, one adds
it to the sampled set if it was not selected yet, or else, an additional randomly chosen alternative is
drawn according to the probability (density) P (w, h).
In case draws are with replacement, this renders the size of the sampled choice set to be equal to
ns + 1. Otherwise, when drawing is without replacement, the expected size of the sampled choice
set is equal ns + 1−
(
piobs0 · (ns + 1)− 1
)
.33
In the present application we opted for sampling with replacement according to equation (a.17), and
treating the number of non–market alternatives as a random variable. In that case, the probability
to draw a choice set D, Π (D), equals:
Π (D) = (piobs0 )k0 ( 1− piobs0Hmin −Hmax
)ns+1−k0 ∏
(wk,hk)∈D\{(0,0)}
n (wk;µ, ς) , (a.18)
where k0 is the actual realisation of K0 for a specific draw of the choice set.
The conditional sampling probabilities, pi (D |k, C ), equal Π (D) /P (wk, hk) for all (wk, hk) ∈ D. So,
the positive conditioning property is satisfied.
The sampled log–likelihood function thus reduces to34:
L (β, δ;X) := −
∑
t
ln
( ∑
k∈Dt
[
exp
[
v (β;xt,k)− v
(
β;xt,j(t)
)] p (δ;xt,q,xt,g1 , wk, hk)
p
(
δ;xt,q,xt,g1 , wj(t), hj(t)
) P (wj(t), hj(t))
P (wk, hk)
])
.
(a.19)
For couples, the elements of the choice set to be sampled consist of quadruples (w1, h1, w2, h2) ∈
[{(0, 0)} ∪ R++ × [Hmin, Hmax[ ]2, specifying a wage labour time regime for each partner i (i =
33 Of course, if the number of times the non–market alternative is drawn, was fixed, the size of the sampled
choice set will be fixed too, and equals ns + 1− (n0 − 1).
34 In the ruromodel, the systematic part of the utility function depends solely on the wage and labour time
characteristics of a job, but parameters of the utility function may depend on individual characteristics, say
xt,V . Therefore v (β;xt,k) is in fact a shorthand for v (β (xt,V ) ;wt,k, ht,k), with β (xt,V ) a function of the
variables xt,V . See Section 2.2 for the relation of preferences defined over the space of consumption leisure
time bundles, and preference in the wage–labour time regime space.
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1, 2). Sampling of these alternatives is done by independently sampling for each of the partners
a wage labour time regime bundle (wi, hi) according to the same prior as for singles, Pi (wi, hi)
(see equation a.17). The probability (density) Pi is indexed on the partner i (i = 1, 2) since their
characterising parameters,
(
piobsi,0 , µi, ςi
)
need not to be the same for both partners.
So, importance sampling of alternatives (w1, h1, w2, h2) takes place according to according to the
probability (density) function:
F (w1, h1, w2, h2) = P1 (w1, h1) · P2 (w2, h2) . (a.20)
Denote the sampled choice set for couples by Dc, and let Dci be the set of combinations of wages
and labour time regimes in the sampled choice set Dc that pertain to partner i. That is, Dc1 :=
{(w1, h1) |∃ (w2, h2) : (w1, h1, w2, h2) ∈ Dc }, and Dc2 := {(w2, h2) |∃ (w1, h1) : (w1, h1, w2, h2) ∈ Dc }.
Furthermore, let k00, k01, k10 be respectively the actual number of times the alternative in which
both do not accept any job offer is drawn, the number of times an alternative in which the first,
respectively second, partner does not accept a job offer while the second, respectively first does, is
drawn, for a specific outcome of the sampling procedure. We then obtain the following sampling
probability for a choice set Dc, Π (Dc):
Π (Dc) = (piobs1,0 · piobs2,0 )k00 · (piobs1,0 · (1− piobs2,0 ))k01 · ((1− piobs1,0 ) · piobs2,0 )k10 ·((
1− piobs1,0
) · (1− piobs2,0 ))ns+1−k00−k01−k10 ·(
1
Hmin−Hmax
)2(ns+1−k00)−k01−k10 · ∏
i=1,2
 ∏
(wi,k,hi,k)∈Dci \{(0,0)}
n (wi,k;µi,0, ςi,0)
 . (a.21)
The conditional sampling probabilities, pi (Dc |k, C ), equal Π (Dc) /
(∏
i=1,2 (Pi (wi,k, hi,k))
)
for all
(w1,k, h1,k, w2,k, h2,k) ∈ Dc. So, the positive conditioning property is satisfied.
The part of the sampled log–likelihood function that pertains to observations on couples, becomes:
L (βc, δ1, δ2;X) :=
−∑t ln(∑k∈Dct[exp [vc (βc;xt,k)− vc (βc;xt,j(t))]∏i=1,2( p(δi;xti,q,xti,w,wi,k,hi,k)p(δi;xti,q,xti,w,wj(ti),hj(ti)) Pi
(
wj(ti)
,hj(ti)
)
Pi(wi,k,hi,k)
)])
.
(a.22)
Here, vc is the household utility function which is defined over quadruples (w1, h1, w2, h2), and
parameters βc may depend on household characteristics or individual household members’ charac-
teristics, as further specified in Section 3.2.
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Appendix III Type specific unemployment rates
The next table contains the type specific unemployment rates that were used as additional identify-
ing variable in the q–functions (the rate of availability of market versus non–market alternatives).
These unemployment rates are gender, age, and educational attainment specific.
Table a.I: Type specific unemplyoment rates (%)
Male Female
Education level Education level
Age group Low Middle High Low Middle High
15 to 24 years 26.4 14.0 12.3 33.6 22.1 11.0
25 to 29 years 19.0 7.6 6.9 29.7 13.1 4.8
30 to 34 years 18.0 6.6 3.1 23.5 9.3 3.3
35 to 39 years 11.6 5.3 2.0 21.2 6.9 3.2
40 to 44 years 9.5 4.2 2.9 12.2 6.2 3.0
45 to 49 years 7.4 2.8 2.7 9.3 5.8 2.4
50 to 54 years 7.0 3.7 2.3 10.1 7.0 3.5
55 to 64 years 4.7 3.0 3.0 5.8 7.8 5.3a
a The exact figure is lacking. The average across all education levels for that age class is taken.
Source: Eurostat Unemployment rates by sex, age and educational attainment level (%), Belgium 2007,
downloaded in October 2013.
Appendix IV Transition matrices
The row totals of the next tables represent the number of persons in the sample observed in the
different labour time regimes (no participation, one to 18.5 hours, half time (18.5–20.5), 20.5 to
29.5 hours, three quarter time (29.5–30.5), 30.5 to 37.5 hours, full time (37.5–40.5), and more than
full time), while the cells for each row reflect how these are distributed across the labour regimes
according to the simulation. The column totals compose then the simulated marginal distribution.
The histograms in the main text (Figures 9 and 12) are thus based on a comparison of the row and
corresponding column totals.
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Table a.II: Observed versus simulated labour time: males in couples
Simulated
Observed no part. 1.0–18.5 18.5–20.5 20.5–29.5 29.5–30.5 30.5–37.5 37.5–40.5 40.5–100 row tot.
no part. 38 1 2 2 1 9 28 18 99
1.0–18.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 1 7
18.5–20.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 14
20.5–29.5 2 0 0 0 0 1 13 3 19
29.5–30.5 4 0 0 1 2 1 16 4 28
30.5–37.5 10 8 2 11 3 21 88 34 177
37.5–40.5 46 16 11 34 12 54 407 183 763
40.5–100 17 5 2 14 8 35 178 91 350
col. tot. 117 30 17 63 26 121 744 339 1457
Table a.III: Observed versus simulated labour time: females in couples
Simulated
Observed no part. 1.0–18.5 18.5–20.5 20.5–29.5 29.5–30.5 30.5–37.5 37.5–40.5 40.5–100 row tot.
no part. 130 15 26 27 18 17 53 14 300
1.0–18.5 20 7 2 0 2 4 25 6 66
18.5–20.5 34 17 7 8 12 13 37 11 139
20.5–29.5 23 18 15 17 7 14 37 17 148
29.5–30.5 14 9 13 11 7 11 32 8 105
30.5–37.5 37 24 18 22 14 17 75 18 225
37.5–40.5 48 44 33 26 24 32 113 52 372
40.5–100 10 7 9 7 5 11 36 17 102
col. tot. 316 141 123 118 89 119 408 143 1457
Table a.IV: Observed versus simulated labour time: single males
Simulated
Observed no part. 1.0–18.5 18.5–20.5 20.5–29.5 29.5–30.5 30.5–37.5 37.5–40.5 40.5–100 row tot.
no part. 47 3 0 1 1 3 30 10 95
1.0–18.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
18.5–20.5 3 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 8
20.5–29.5 1 0 1 1 0 0 7 2 12
29.5–30.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
30.5–37.5 4 1 2 1 1 4 25 11 49
37.5–40.5 24 8 4 16 1 17 90 39 199
40.5–100 6 1 2 2 1 9 41 18 80
col. tot. 85 14 9 21 5 33 199 83 449
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Table a.V: Observed versus simulated labour time: single females
Simulated
Observed no part. 1.0–18.5 18.5–20.5 20.5–29.5 29.5–30.5 30.5–37.5 37.5–40.5 40.5–100 row tot.
no part. 103 11 4 10 11 8 26 9 182
1.0–18.5 3 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 9
18.5–20.5 11 3 1 0 1 2 8 3 29
20.5–29.5 4 2 1 1 3 1 6 7 25
29.5–30.5 7 1 1 1 1 2 13 1 27
30.5–37.5 18 4 5 3 2 4 22 6 64
37.5–40.5 35 8 6 21 11 12 62 29 184
40.5–100 8 1 1 2 1 5 8 25 51
col. tot. 189 30 19 38 30 34 151 80 571
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